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STATE BALLOT INITIATIVES
IN THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION EQUATION:
A MEDICAL MARIJUANA CASE STUDY
KK DuVivier*

One of the primary innovations of the U.S. government was "the
great invention that a man might be protected in his liberties
not only from the King, the Executive, but from government of
any sort, from the very government we were about to create."'

Ballot initiatives represent a process of creating laws, not
2
through legislatures
but by direct citizen vote. The process has
many critics.3 Is it too controlled by moneyed special interests? 4
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I am
deeply grateful to the following colleagues for their support and valuable input
on this piece: J. Robert Brown, Penelope Bryan, Nancy Ehrenreich, Eric
Freedman, Martin Katz, Jan Laitos, Richard Neumann, John H. Reese, Louis J.
Sirico, Jr., and Daniel Smith. I also would like to thank Diane Burkhardt, Nate
Kunz, Michelle McDonald, Brian Vicente, Kathy Kanda, Wendy Hardman, and
Linsday Burleson for their research assistance. Finally, I appreciate the
administrative support provided by Kimberly Lynn, Kristin Schneider,
Marianna Galstyan, and Laura Wyant.
1. FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION As IT PROTECTS
PRIVATE RIGHTS 14 (1923). "The clauses and number of rights or powers

reserved to the people "far outnumber, both in Federal, and still more, in State
Constitutions those things which are permitted." Id. at 173. Furthermore,
because the Constitution is a document of limitation, it contains more
prohibitions of power than grants, yet "nothing is forbidden to the people"
because they are the source of all power. Id. at 168.
2. The initiative process allows citizens to place legislation or a
constitutional amendment on the ballot for voter approval by petition. The
referendum allows citizens to reject laws or amendments proposed by state
legislatures. See generally Initiative & Referendum Institute at the University
of Southern California, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org (last visited Jan. 28,
2005). This Article will not distinguish between referenda and citizen
initiatives for purposes of describing lawmaking by direct citizen vote.
3.

See, e.g.,

DAVID

B.

MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT

5 (1984); Richard B. Collins & Dale
Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative:Procedures That Do and Don't Work,
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47 (1995); David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An
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Does it reflect the will of an uninformed majority5 or an informed
majority that wishes to impose its will unfairly on minorities?6 Are
the results unpredictable, and do they wreak havoc on legislative
discretion?
Whatever the criticisms, the ballot initiative process has become
a fundamental factor in governing this country. Limited to the
states, it represents the only significant mechanism for the exercise
of direct democracy. Moreover, even its critics have recognized its
advantages in certain contexts. For example, it is a valuable tool for
achieving political reforms that legislators who benefit from the
The initiative also has
status quo are reluctant to embrace.!
advantages as a device to advance social agendas not otherwise able

Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13
(1995) [hereinafter Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?].
4. See, e.g., BETTY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: STATE
BALLOT ISSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (1982); Elizabeth Garrett, Money,
Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845 (1999); Clayton P.
Gillette, Is Direct Democracy Anti-Democratic?, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 609
(1998); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions:
Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the FirstAmendment, 29 UCLA L.
REV. 505 (1982); Randy M. Mastro et al., Taking the Initiative: Corporate
Control of the Referendum Process Through Media Spending and What to Do
About It, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 315 (1981); John S. Shockley, Direct Democracy,
Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and
Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377 (1985); Daniel
A. Smith, Campaign Financingof Ballot Initiatives in the American States, in
DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 71
(Larry Sabato et al. eds., 2001).
5. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 3; Collins & Oesterle, supra note 3;
Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination:A
Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707 (1992); Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
The Referendum: Democracy's Barrierto Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1
(1978); Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critiqueof Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 434 (1998); Priscilla F. Gunn, Initiatives and Referendum: Direct
Democracy and Minority Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN. 135 (1981); Hans A. Linde,
When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign
Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SuP. CT. REV.
127 (1983); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and
Referendums in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities'Democratic Citizenship, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Preferences, Priorities,and Plebiscites, 13 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 317 (2004); Sherman J. Clark, The Characterof Direct
Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 341 (2004); Richard L. Hasen,
Comments on Baker, Clark, and Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 563 (2004).
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to survive the legislative process.8 Two of the most recent examples
are ballot initiatives that created laws permitting the medical use of
marijuana and the right to assisted suicide for the terminally ill. 9
The November 2004 California initiative concerning funding for
stem cell research may also fall into this category. 10
As with the political reform initiatives, this second type of ballot
initiative represents a category for which the initiative process is
especially appropriate: issues requiring experimentation in the area
of health, traditionally a topic of strong concern at the state level.
Furthermore, this category of initiative does not suffer from the ills
that detractors note in other contexts. These initiatives expand
personal rights and do not infringe on others' rights, and they
address elemental issues, so citizens can be sufficiently informed to
cast votes representing their convictions. These types of initiatives,
however, confront a significant problem. They frequently involve
areas of law already subject to preexisting federal regulation.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law
To the extent these ballot
preempts conflicting state laws."
initiatives conflict with federal legislation, they are preempted, and
the social experiment comes to an end.
This problem can be seen with particular clarity in connection
with the medical use of marijuana. Citizens in a number of states
have used the ballot initiative process to legalize medical
marijuana. 12 These initiatives demonstrate growing support for
8. Women turned to initiatives and referenda in the late 1800s to secure
the right to vote. See Sandra Day O'Connor, The History of the Women's
Suffrage Movement, 49 VAND. L. REV. 657 (1996).
9. For states that have codified ballot measures allowing medicinal
marijuana, see infra note 12. Oregon voters also passed an initiative for
assisted suicide. See The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 127.800-.897 (2003).
10. Proposition 71 passed with 59% of the vote. It sets aside $3 billion for
stem cell research. Amelia Neufeld & Jia-Rui Chong, Voters to Face 14
Initiatives on Nov. Ballot, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2004, at B5; League of Women
Voters of California, Smart Voter, at http://www.smartvoter.org/2004/11/02/
ca/state/prop/71/ (last visited January 25, 2005).
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. Specifically, the Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
12. Alaska voters approved Ballot Measure 8 in 1998, codified as Medical
Uses of Marijuana for Persons Suffering from Debilitating Medical Conditions
Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010-.37.070 (Michie 2003); Arizona voters approved
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decriminalization of marijuana, at least where medically justified.
Despite the growing agreement on this issue, the U.S. Supreme
Court found in 2002 that the federal Controlled Substances Act
("CSA") 13 preempted California's medical marijuana initiative, at
least with respect to manufacturing and distribution by cannabis
clubs. 4 Arguably, the use of preemption in this case ended a process
of experimentation that moved states closer to consensus and
shifted resolution of an essentially local issue of health and safety to
the federal level.
Ballot initiatives similar to the medical marijuana initiatives
represent a category characterized by an alignment of compelling
factors-experimental interests in an area of traditionally strong
local concern that expand individual rights without infringing on
others. Initiatives in this category should receive greater deference
when courts assess their validity under the preemption doctrine.
Precedent exists for providing deference in these circumstances.
The courts have often spoken of a presumption against preemption
for certain state laws. 5 As applied, however, the presumption

Proposition 200 in 1996, codified as Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and
Control Act of 1996, ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3412.01 (2004); California voters
approved Proposition 215, § 1 in 1996, codified as Compassionate Use Act of
1996, CAL. HEATH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2000); Colorado voters
approved Amendment 20 in 2000, codified as Medical Use of Marijuana for
Persons Suffering from Debilitating Medical Conditions, COLO. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 14 (2000); Maine approved Question 2 in 1999, codified as Maine
Medical Marijuana Act of 1998, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5821-A (West
2004); Nevada voters approved Ballot Question 9 in 2000, codified as NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 453A.010-.810 (2003); Oregon voters approved Measure 67 in 1998,
codified as Oregon Medical Marijuana Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.300-.346
(2003); and Washington voters approved Initiative Measure No. 692, codified as
Medical Use of Marijuana Act, WASH. REV. CODE. ch. 69.51A (2004). In
November 2004, Montana voters approved 1-148, which allows patients to use,
possess, and grow medical marijuana. 2004 Mont. Laws. Init. Measure 148.
13. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
14. The Court ruled that the CSA does not have a medical necessity
exception: "As explained above, in the Controlled Substances Act, the balance
already has been struck against a medical necessity exception. Because the
statutory prohibitions cover even those who have what could be termed a
medical necessity, the Act precludes consideration of this evidence." United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 499 (2001).
15. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S.
Ct. 1756 (2004); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505
U.S. 88 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Mintz v.
Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211
(1824).
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little more than an aphorism
against preemption often
16 has been
content.
specific
no
with
With respect to ballot initiatives involving experimental issues
of traditional local concern, courts should provide an enhanced
review that requires a greater effort to reconcile the ballot initiative
with the federal regulatory scheme. This would require the courts
to accept any "sensible" interpretation of the two laws that would
allow the initiative to survive by avoiding a finding of conflict. 17 To
do so, courts would be required to examine not only the language of
the federal statute itself, but also the statutory framework, the
legislative history, and extrinsic sources. In other words, the search
for a sensible interpretation could not be limited to the text of a
statute alone.
This approach could make a difference in the medical marijuana
area. In striking down California's ballot initiative, the Supreme
Court looked only at the text of the statute to conclude that the CSA
barred the distribution of marijuana and included no exception for
medical use.18 Greater deference and resort to extrinsic sources,
however, can provide a mechanism for reconciling the CSA with
ballot initiatives similar to California's initiatives. The statutory
framework and legislative history of the CSA indicate that Congress
was concerned primarily with drug abuse and drug trafficking. 19
Furthermore, the CSA contains an exception for possessionS • of20
doctor's
prescription.
through
a
controlled
substances
Consequently, the CSA could sensibly be read in conjunction with a
ballot initiative to allow possession of marijuana by individuals who
use it according to their doctors' orders.
Medical marijuana is now back before the Supreme Court.21 On
November 29, 2004, the Court heard oral argument on a Ninth
Circuit case that used the Commerce Clause to limit the reach of the
CSA against individuals who were using medical marijuana under
California's initiative.22 The Ninth Circuit's approach, however,
breaks from a well-developed body of case law suggesting that
16. See infra Part IL
17. See infra Part II.C (addressing Justice Souter's dissent in Engine
ManufacturersAssociation).
18. Oakland Cannabis,532 U.S. at 483.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
20. Id. at § 844(a).
21. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.
Ct. 2909 (2004).
22. Charles Lane, High Court Not Receptive to Marijuana Case, WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 2004, at A3. The Ninth Circuit concluded that individual use of
medical marijuana was beyond the reach of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority. See infra notes 394-97 and accompanying text
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Congress has broad authority under the Commerce Clause to
criminalize drug use and possession.23 The better way to reconcile
medical marijuana initiatives and the CSA is to argue for greater
deference for such initiatives in a preemption context. Doing so
would require the examination not only of the text of the statute but
extrinsic sources as well. Such an examination would provide a
basis for concluding that the two legal regimes can coexist.
This Article will examine, the need for greater deference in
preemption analysis of ballot initiatives involving local
experimentation in the area of health and safety. Part I provides
background about the history and present status of the ballot
initiative process. Part II explains the preemption issues and
establishes how the presumption against preemption is an
appropriate mechanism to apply in the analysis of this category of
initiatives. Part III provides background about the medical
marijuana initiatives and uses California's Proposition 21524 as a

23. See Debra Yvonne Hughes, The Supremacy Clause Disappearsin a Puff
of Smoke-The Effort of Medical MarijuanaSupporters to Circumvent Federal

Law in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 26 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 131 (2000); Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Facto
Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 707 (1998).
See generally MARTIN ALAN GREENBERG, PROHIBITION
ENFORCEMENT: CHARTING A NEW MISSION 6, 190-91 (1999). But cf. Arleen
Hussein, Comment, The Growing Debate on Medical Marijuana:Federal Power

v. States Rights, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 369 (2001); Erik R. Neusch, Comment,
Medical Marijuana's Fate in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court's New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,72 U. COLO. L. REV. 201 (2001); Alistair E.
Newbern, Comment, Good Cop, Bad Cop: FederalProsecution of State-Legalized

Medical Marijuana Use After United States v. Lopez, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1575
(2000); see also Allison L. Bergstrom, Medical Use of Marijuana:A Look at
Federal & State Responses to California's Compassionate Use Act, 2 DEPAUL J.
OF HEALTH CARE L. 155 (1997); Aryeh Y. Brown, Comment, In Memoriam:
Ralph Seeley Obscured by Smoke: Medicinal Marijuana and the Need for
RepresentationReinforcement Review, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175 (1998); Nicole
Dogwill, Comment, The Burning Question: How Will the United States Deal
With the Medical-MarijuanaDebate?, 1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 247
(1997); Suzanne D. McGuire, Comment, Medical Marijuana: State Law
Undermines Federal MarijuanaPolicy-Is the Establishment Going to Pot?, 7
SAN JOAQUIN AGRI. L. REV. 73 (1997); Marcia Tiersky, Comment, Medical
Marijuana:Putting the Power Where It Belongs, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547 (1999).

24. Cal. Proposition 215 (1996) (codified as The Compassionate Use Act of
1996, CAL. HEALTH

AND SAFETY CODE §

11362.5 (Deering 2000)). The Proposition

states:
This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with
the provisions of Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution.
This initiative measure adds a section to the Health and Safety Code;
therefore, new provisions proposed to be added are printed in italic
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case study to show the potential impact of a heightened presumption
against preemption in the medical marijuana context.
I.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE

The United States was founded on democratic ideals, but the
original government relied little on direct democracy. In drafting
the Constitution, the founders consciously chose a representative
model, rejecting direct citizen votes even for electing most
type to indicate that they are new.
PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. Section 11362.5 is added to the Health and Safety Code,
to read:
11362.5. (a)This section shall be known and may be cited as the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996.
(b)(1) The people of the State of Californiahereby find and declare that
the purposes of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 are as follows:
(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californianshave the right to obtain
and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is
deemed appropriateand has been recommended by a physician who
has determined that the person's health would benefit from the use of
marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain,
spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis,migraine, or any other illness for which
marijuanaprovides relief
(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain
and use marijuanafor medical purposes upon the recommendation of
a physician are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction.
(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a
plan to provide for the safe and affordable distributionof marijuanato
all patients in medical need of marijuana.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede legislation
prohibitingpersons from engaging in conduct that endangers others,
nor to condone the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes.
(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician in this
state shall be punished, or denied any right or privilege, for having
recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.
(d) Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and
Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana,shall not apply
to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or
cultivates marijuanafor the personal medical purposes of the patient
upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.
(e)For the purposes of this section, "primary caregiver" means the
individual designated by the person exempted under this section who
has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or
safety of thatperson.

SECTION 2. If any provision of this measure or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, that invalidity
shall not affect other provisions or applications of the measure that
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
this end the provisions of this measure are severable.
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representatives. Likewise, all state governments initially employed
only a system of representative democracy.
Since the founding, however, opportunities for direct citizen
votes have expanded extensively in this country. Citizens now vote
directly for all of their federal representatives, and all states have
some form of direct voting process by initiative or referendum at the
state level. Although initiatives and referenda may never gain
acceptance on a national scale, in many states, they now represent a
significant exercise of direct democracy. 5
A.

Direct Democracy and the Federal Government

The initiative process has had considerable influence on public
26
The ballot initiative achieved this success while remaining
exclusively a state and local process. Initiatives are not used at the
federal level. The United States remains one of "five major
democracies [that has] never had a national referendum."27
policy.

25. Although opinion polls show that the majority of Americans back the
concept of a national initiative, disfavor with the process in Congress seems to
make a national initiative unlikely in the near future. A national poll reflected
backing for a national statutory initiative at a three-to-one margin (with 57% of
Americans favoring it and only 21% opposed). DAVID D.
LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 176 (1989).

SCHMIDT, CITIZEN

See also THOMAS
CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL 4-5, 157-95 (1989); MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 7, 12-14. Recently, Mike
E.

Gavel, former senator from Alaska, used the Internet to garner support for a
national initiative. In 2002, the group attracted participants to a conference in
Williamsburg, Virginia, and received supportive votes through the Internet.
See Sen. Mike Gavel, Edwin and Joyce Koupal's Contribution to Democracy,

Democracy Symposium in Honor of Edwin and Joyce Koupal, at
http://ni4d.us/symposium/5.htm (Sept. 1, 2001).
26. Initiatives on various public policy issues have brought about
fundamental changes in the United States, including, but not limited to: women
gaining the right to vote; politicians elected through direct primaries;
prohibition on state-funded abortions; creation of the eight-hour workday;
legalization of physician-assisted suicide; placement of term limits on elected
officials; adoption and abolishment of prohibition; abolishment of poll taxes;
legalization of marijuana; and adoption of campaign finance reform. M. Dane
Waters, A Brief History of the Initiative and Referendum Process in the United

States, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%2OInfo/Drop%
20Down%20Boxes/Quick%20Facts/History%20of/20I&R.pdf (last visited Jan.
20, 2005) [hereinafter IRI BriefHistory].
27.

Dennis Polhill, The Issue of a National Initiative Process, Initiative &

Referendum Inst., at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/National%201&R.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2005). Polhill lists India, Israel, Japan, Netherlands and the
United States as the five major democracies that do not have a national
referendum. National referenda are prevalent among the world's democracies.
For example, Switzerland has held approximately 400 national referenda; a
national referendum was used when Norway separated from Sweden in 1905;

INITIATIVES IN THE PREEMPTIONEQUATION

20051

229

This was no accident. In creating a national government, the
founders diverged from contemporary European models. Instead of
monarchs and other non-democratic forms of government, the
founders embraced ideals of natural law and the sovereignty of the
As Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of
people. 28
by "deriving their
Independence, governments gain their legitimacy
29
just powers from the consent of the governed."
At the same time, however, the framers rejected direct
democracy and instead opted for a republican form of government.3 °
Although some argue the initial choice of a republican government
arose simply out of practical necessity," documentation of debates at
the time show that the choice also was driven by a "distrust of
popular decision making at the time of the Founding. 3 2 As a result,
government at the federal level had no provisions for direct
democracy and, indeed, allowed direct election only for members of
the House of Representatives. The President was elected by the
33
members of the Electoral College, and not by the people directly.

Senators were indirectly elected by state legislators.34
Nonetheless, the choice of a republican form of government did
not reflect a rejection of popular sovereignty. James Madison, who
favored the republican model because of its ability to filter public
views,35 voiced faith in the people by noting that there was
Hitler used national referenda to withdraw Germany from the League of
Nations in 1934; and the demise of the Soviet Union was effectuated through a
national referendum. Id.
28. See generally JOHN LOcKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Dover Publications 1959)
(1690); see also JOHN LOcKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIvIL GOVERNMENT (J.W.
Gough ed., A.R. Mowbray & Co. 1946) (1690).
29. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Jefferson
embraced Locke's teachings and advocated that Locke be one of three mandated
readings for all students. See Dennis Polhill, Democracy's Journey, in THE
BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 5 (M. Dane Waters
ed., 2001).
30.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER, THE
LAw 137-87 (1909); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 55, 63 (James Madison).

PEOPLE'S

31. Gillette, supra note 4, at 615.
32. Id. at 618.

33. In the 2000 election, George W. Bush won the presidential election by
carrying the Electoral College, even though opponent Al Gore won the popular
vote by more than 500,000 ballots. David Stout, Gore Gains More Popular
Votes: Vice President's Edge is 539,974 Over Bush, Survey Shows, CHI. TRIB.,

Dec. 31, 2000, at 6.
34. Note how this changed in 1913 with the 17th Amendment, which
provided for the popular election of Senators. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
35. As Madison stated:
[A republic] refine[s] and enlarge[s] the public views, by passing them
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"sufficient virtue among men for self-government." 36 Indeed, the
founders acknowledged the importance of citizen participation when
they decided that citizen conventions, rather than state legislatures,
In McCulloch v. Maryland,"
must ratify the U.S. Constitution.
Justice Marshall also noted that citizens directly, and not their state
legislatures, had to ratify the Constitution, because no 39state
government could control this decision for the people of a state.
Direct Democracy and State Governments
Although state governments also employ a system of
representative democracy, every state gives its citizens some forum
for voting directly, either by initiative or referendum." About half of
these states allow their citizens to introduce laws through the ballot
initiative process.

B.

History of Ballot Initiatives
The Constitution may have rejected direct democracy at the
federal level, but it did nothing to impede or advance the model at
the state level. In fact, James Madison noted that "ultimate
authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the
people alone."42
American citizens have a long history of using direct democracy.
Starting in the 1600s, citizens directly introduced issues for vote at
New England town meetings. In 1778, Massachusetts became the
first state to hold a statewide citizen vote for a legislative
1.

through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may
best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism
and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 46-47 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 284 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed.,
1982).

37. See

CRONIN, supra note 25, at 12-22, 41.
38. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819).
39. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 849 n.2 (1995) (citing
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403).
40. See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., TABLE: 1.2, STATES WITH
LEGISLATIVE

REFERENDUM

(LR)

FOR

STATUTES

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20
Info/Drop%2ODown%2OBoxes/Requirements/Legislative%20Referendum%2OSta
AMENDMENTS,

at

tes.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
41. Id.
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 237 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed.,

1982).
43. See ALEXIS DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 69-79 (Phillips
Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
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referendum with New Hampshire following in 1792. 4 Many state
constitutions were ratified by direct popular votes, and one
authority declared that "submission of constitutional provisions to
popular
ratification was a fundamental principle of American public
45
law.
Although none of the original state constitutions contained a
process for direct citizen initiation of laws through petition, 6 the
Progressive Movement 47 successfully introduced such measures in
' The Progressives grew distrustful of legislatures
the late 1800s.4
controlled by special interests 49 and proposed the initiative to
ameliorate the deficiencies of the nation's representative form of
government. 50 The Progressives argued that initiatives could correct
the undue influence moneyed interests5
had on elected
representatives and could force action when legislatures deadlocked
and became "paralyzed by inaction."52
In 1897, Nebraska became the first state to adopt the initiative
process when Nebraska cities incorporated the initiative and
referendum into their charters.53 A year later, South Dakota became

44.
45.

IRI BriefHistory, supra note 26, at 1.
CHARLES A. BEARD & BIRL E. SCHULTZ,

DOCUMENTS ON THE STATE-WIDE

INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 16 (1912).

46. IRI Brief History, supra note 26, at 2. The initiative has two variations:
direct initiative and indirect initiative. Direct initiative is a process by which
constitutional amendments or statutes proposed by the people are directly
placed on the ballot without the assistance of state legislatures. The ballot is
submitted to voters for their approval or rejection. Indirect initiative is a
process by which statute or amendment proposed by the people through a
petition is submitted to the state legislature during the legislative session. The
legislature approves or modifies the proposed legislation.
47. In addition to the initiative and referendum process, the Progressive
movement sought a number of political reforms including secret ballots, direct
election of U.S. senators, primary elections, and women's suffrage. See IRI
BriefHistory, supra note 26, at 2.
48. Id.

49. Id. In California, the initiative was introduced to wrest control of the
state government from the Southern Pacific Company. See James E. Castello,
The Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to Control
Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL. L. REv. 491, 503 (1986) (citing Governor Hiram
Johnson, Inaugural Address (Jan. 3, 1911), reprinted in FRANLIN HICHBORN,
THE STORY OF THE SESSION OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE OF 1911 at ii-iii app.

(1911)).
50. See, e.g., Beall v. State, 103 A. 99, 102-03 (Md. 1917); State v. Howell,
181 P. 920, 921 (Wash. 1919).
51. CRONIN, supra note 25, at 12-22, 54-57.
52. IRI Brief History, supra note 26, at 2.
53. Id.
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the first state to allow statewide initiatives and popular referenda.14
During the Progressive Era, 55 twenty-three other states followed
South Dakota's lead and adopted either a statewide initiative, a
referendum process, or both. 56 The same period also saw the only
significant effort to challenge initiatives. In Pacific States Telephone
& Telegraph v. Oregon,57 the Supreme Court settled the issue by
declaring the Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter.58 In so
doing, it effectively dismissed opponents' claims that representative
government and direct democracy could not coexist and that
initiatives violated the Constitution's Guaranty Clause.5 9
Because of the strength of the Populist Movement in the
western part of the United States, initiatives and referenda became
a phenomenon in that region.6 ° Since 1918, however, the practice
has spread to other regions. When Alaska joined the Union in 1959,
its constitution included the right for citizens to enact statutes or
amend the state constitution by initiative.6 ' Illinois adopted the
statewide initiative in 1970, and Florida followed suit in 1972.62 In
1992, Mississippi became the most recent state to adopt the
initiative process.63
Currently, twenty-four states give their citizens some
opportunity to vote directly to adopt new laws or to amend their

54. Id.

55. In the late 1890s, the Progressives introduced the initiative process in
the United States as part of their reform platform. CRONIN, supra note 25, at 5051.
56. These were Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. IRI Brief History, supra note 26, at
3;

INITIATIVE

&

REFERENDUM

INSTITUTE,

I&R

HISTORICAL

TIMELINE,

at

http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%2OInfo/Drop%20Down%
20Boxes/Quick%20Facts/Almanac%20-%20I&R%20Historical%2OTimeline.pdf
(last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
57. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
58. Id. at 140. The Court concluded that the issue was "political" and that
the Court lacked jurisdiction to declare the initiative process violative of the
Constitution. Id.
59. Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution reads: "The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence."
60.

ROBERT TREAT

PAiNE, THE

INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL

(William B. Munro ed., 1912).
61. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.010-.45.245 (Michie 2004).
62. IRI BriefHistory, supra note 26, at 4-5.

63. Id. at 5.

94-112
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state constitutions.6 4 Furthermore, citizens in all fifty states now
have some right to vote directly to accept or reject statutes or
constitutional amendments proposed by their state legislatures

through referenda.65
Citizens have used the initiative process sporadically.
Initiatives were employed extensively in the early part of the
twentieth century, but their use declined substantially from the
early 1940s through the 1960s.66 A dramatic resurgence occurred in
the 1970s,67 beginning with Proposition 13, the California tax
limitation initiative.68
The resurgence that began in the 1970s has continued until
today. In the November 7, 2000 elections, American citizens voted
on over seventy-one statewide initiatives.6 9 Historically, Oregon,

64. The following states allow some form of initiative: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See
Thomas M. Durbin, Initiative, Referendum and Recall: A Resume of State

Provisions [1981] Rep. No. 81-63A (Cong. Research Serv.); IRI Brief History,
supra note 26, at 5.
65. The referendum has two components: popular referendum and
legislative referendum. The popular referendum is a process where the people
have the power to submit legislation enacted by their legislature to the people
to accept or reject.
The submission process is performed by obtaining
signatures on a petition. The legislative referendum is a measure placed on the
ballot by a state or local government and submitted to the people directly for
their approval or rejection. See IRI BriefHistory, supra note 26.
66. See Charles M. Price, Initiative Qualifying in the States, 1898-1989:
Variations in Usage, 12 FAM. LAW & DEMOCRACY REP., Feb. 1990, at 4.

67. The two most expansive decades of initiative use occurred during the
years of 1981-1990 and 1991-2000, where there were 271 and 389 initiative
platforms respectively. See IRI Brief History, supra note 26, at 8. Note that,
other than Alaska, all of the states that have adopted the initiative process
recently have done so since 1970.
68. Jim Wasserman, Tax-Cutting Proposition 13 Sparked Revolt, DENVER

POST, June 2, 2003, at 6A. In a February 2003 poll by the Public Policy
Institute of California, 65% of homeowners say the proposition was "mostly a
good thing for California."

PuB. POL. INST. OF CAL., PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY:
GOVERNMENT,
at 10 (2003), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/S-203MBS.pdf.
CALIFORNIANS

AND

THEIR

69. Approximately 35% of the initiatives were placed on the ballot by the
people using the initiative process and approximately 65% were placed on
ballots by the legislature. See INITIATIVE

& REFERENDUM

INSTITUTE, GENERAL

(Nov.
5,
2002),
at
http://www.iandrinstitute.orgNew%20IRI%2OWebsite%2Info/Drop%2Down%
20Boxes/Election%20Reports/2002%20General%20Election/2002%20POSTelection%20Report%20-%2012-11-02%20-%2OState%20by%20State.pdf
[hereinafter IRI POST ELECTION REPORT].
ELECTION

POST

ELECTION

REPORT

1-5
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California, Colorado, North Dakota,
S
71 and Arizona have used the
initiative process most extensively.
California and Oregon alone
accounted for nearly one-third of all qualifying initiatives in the
1980s, and the five high-use states have accounted for nearly 60% of
initiatives qualified in the twenty-three initiative states.7 1 Some
commentators note that in states with the highest initiative use, all
significant amendments to these states' constitutions have
originated as ballot initiatives. 72
2.

Benefits and Criticisms of the InitiativeProcess

Initiatives are difficult to categorize. They vary considerably in
form, and states rarely place limitations on their subject matter.73
Consequently, they have addressed a wide range of issues from the
mundane (for example, permission for a single street cop to carry a
ventriloquist dummy) 74 to the metaphysical (for example,
recognizing a right to die). 7 5 In the November 2002 elections, the

issues most frequently addressed in the 202 statewide ballot
measures from forty states were drug policy reform, animal rights,
education reform, election reform, gaming, and taxes. 6
Ballot initiatives are often vehicles for ideological conflicts.
Although the process was initially proposed by the Progressives, it
70. Oregon has proposed 325 measures; California, 279; Colorado, 183;
North Dakota, 168; and Arizona, 154. IRI Brief History, supra note 26.
71. See Price, supra note 66, at 4.
72.
REV.

Richard B. Collins, How Democratic Are Initiatives?, 72 U. COLO. L.

983, 983 nn.2-3 (2001) (basing his observation on data from Dennis Polhill,

Are Coloradans Fit to Make Their Own Laws? A Common-Sense Primeron the
Initiative Process, Appendix B, INDEPENDENCE INST. (Oct. 24, 1996)

(summarizing election results on all Colorado ballot issues from 1912 to 1995),
available at http://i2i.org/articles/PoliticsandGovernment/8-96.pdf)). See also
PHILIP L. DuBoIs & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAIUNG BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS

30 (1998); CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY
INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1992); Hans
AND COMPARISONS

A. Linde, Taking Oregon's Initiative Toward a New Century, 34 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 391, 391-98 (1998)

73. See Smith, supra note 4, at 85.
74. In 1993, San Francisco voters passed Proposition BB, which allowed
police officer Bob Geary to bring his ventriloquist's dummy, Brendan O'Smarty,
on patrol. Jenifer Warren, Splinter Vote; It's the Dummy, Stupid! San
FranciscansTackle a Tough Issue, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1993, at A3.
75. See, e.g., The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT.

§§ 127.800-.897 (2003). On November 4, 1997, the people of Oregon voted by a
margin of 60-40 percent against Measure 51, which would have repealed the
Oregon Death with Dignity Act. See Oregon Secretary of State, Official Results:
State Measure No. 51 (Nov. 4, 1997), available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/
elections/nov497/other.info/m5labst.htm (last updated December 3, 1997).
76.

IRI POST ELECTION REPORT, supra note 69, at 1-5.
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now has been embraced equally by conservative groups. 7 Still, in
neither theory nor practice do initiatives promote any particular
agenda over another. They cover a wide range of topics from the
death penalty to the legalization of marijuana, and their supporters
"span the political spectrum-from Ralph Nader on the left to Ross
Perot in the center to Jack Kemp on the right."78
When the use of initiatives resurged in the 1970s,
commentators began to reassess the process. 9 Criticisms sparked
proposals for reform.8 ° Furthermore, in response to the critics, a
number of defenders emerged to argue not only that initiatives serve
as a valuable way of giving citizens a direct voice in their
government but also that their use should be expanded to the
national level.8 Although criticism of initiatives is valid in many
contexts, the benefits of some initiatives, at least some of those
allowing social experimentation in health and safety, sufficiently
outweigh the drawbacks such that they deserve greater deference
when threatened by preemption.
Benefits
Ballot initiatives have a number of advantages. They represent
an exercise of direct democracy, encouraging individual
They represent a
participation in the legislative process.
mechanism for bypassing a legislature unwilling to adopt laws that
reflect the interests of its citizens. Ballot initiatives are also a
method of allowing for experimentation and the development of a
national consensus on important social and other issues.
a.

77. Eule, supra note 5, at 1507.
78.

AKHIL

REED AMAR

&

ALAN HIRSCH,

FOR

THE PEOPLE:

WHAT THE

CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOuR RIGHTS 38(1998).
79. MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 5; see, e.g., Sherman

J. Clark, A Populist
Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434 (1998) (arguing that
plebiscites do not accurately reflect the complexities of voter preferences); Eule,
supranote 5 (discussing how courts should proceed in deciding constitutionality
challenges to voter enactments); Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?, supra note 3,
at 46 (stating that "[dlirect legislation is at best a supplement to representative
democracy").
80. See, e.g., CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE:
SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1992); Collins, supra

note 72; Collins & Oesterle, supra note 3.
81. See, e.g., AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 78;

CRONIN, supra note 25, at 1222, 41; Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government and PopularDistrust: The
Constitutional
Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum Regarding State
Amendment by Initiative Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 5 (1992); Gillette,
supra note 4; Alan Hirsch, Direct Democracy and Civic Maturation, 29
HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 185 (2002).
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i. Encouraging Democratic Participation of Citizens. Ballot
initiatives enjoy a unique position as an instrument of government.
They promote democracy in its purest form by giving a direct voice
to the people that is distinct from the indirect one provided by the
representative system of government.82
Through the initiative
process, the people can create legislation and amend state
constitutions directly. Individual citizens, as opposed to elected
representatives, draft the language.
Initiatives provide an
opportunity to adopt legislation that would otherwise not pass the
legislature or to overturn legislation adopted by the legislature. As
one court noted, "the power of initiative is a fundamental right at
the very core of our republican form of government. " 8
James Madison noted the people's "first and most natural
attachment" 4 would be to a government that is closer to them.
Initiatives "occup[y] a special posture in this nation's constitutional
tradition and jurisprudence" because they are the "level of
government . . . closest to the people."" Although elected state
82. Some have characterized the initiative as the "fourth branch of
government."

See, e.g.,

CAL.

COMM'N ON

CAMPAIGN

FIN.,

DEMOCRACY

INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

BY

54 (1992);

see also State v. Houge, 271 N.W. 677, 680 (N.D. 1937) (noting that the state's
legislative assembly and its citizens have "coextensive legislative power"); State
ex rel. Pierce v. Slusher, 248 P. 358, 360 (Or. 1926) (stating that through the
initiative, the people are a coordinate branch of the legislative body). In
contrast to the Athenian-style democracies feared by the nation's founders
because of their potential for mob rule "incompatible with personal security, or
the rights of property," the current initiative process encourages more
reflection. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961) ("Such democracies . . .have ever been found incompatible

with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as
short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."). It uses the same
methods as used in voting for elected officials: the ballot is drawn up and
publicized in advance, and each person votes privately by recorded ballot.
83. McKee v. City of Louisville, 616 P.2d 969, 972 (Colo. 1980). See also
Taxpayers v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220, 1235 (Cal. 1990)
("In order to further the fundamental right of the electorate to enact legislation
through the initiative process, this court must on occasion indulge in a
presumption that the voters thoroughly study and understand the content of
complex initiative measures.").
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 292 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).
85. Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 297 (6th Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted). Specifically, the court stated:
As the product of direct legislation by the people, a popularly
enacted initiative or referendum occupies a special posture in this
nation's constitutional tradition and jurisprudence. An expression of
the popular will expressed by majority plebiscite, especially at the
lowest level of government (which is the level of government closest to
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representatives may try to reflect the wishes of their constituents,
some commentators have noted they are "still one large step
6
In
[further] away from reflecting popular will" than an initiative.
addition, members of Congress are even further "removed from the
7
individual citizen and from local democratic control," both spatially
and demographically. 8
the people), must not be cavalierly disregarded.
Id.

86. Eule, supra note 5, at 1521. Specifically, Eule notes:
To be sure, these representatives often purport to speak on behalf of
their constituents, but it is fanciful to equate the two. If our goal is to
assess majority will, the legislature appears to start at a distinct
disadvantage. Even if it does better than plebiscites at aggregating
individual preferences, its collective judgment is still one large step
away from reflecting popular will.
Id.
87. Edwin Meese & Rhet DeHart, How Washington Subverts Your Local
Sheriff, J. AM. CITIZENSHIP & POLY REV., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 48, 53. Specifically,

Meese & DeHart state:
The federal law-enforcement apparatus is quite removed from the
individual citizen and from local democratic control. Unlike their
federal counterparts, who are appointed by the president, local
sheriffs and district attorneys are directly elected by and must answer
to local citizens . .

.

. If voters are dissatisfied with their sheriff,

district attorney, or local police force, they can vote the appropriate
officials out of office. However, the voters do not have this direct
option with federal law-enforcement officials.
Id.

88. Statistics show that the average member of Congress earns $155,000
per year in comparison with the average adult American, who earns $50,000
per year. Furthermore, the average voter is 46 years of age or younger, yet the
average Congressperson is 55 years old. Mildred L. Amer, Membership of the
108th Congress: A

Profile [2004]

(Cong. Research

Serv.), available at

http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS21379.pdf;
Research,

Average

Voters

Are

NOT

Average

Center for Media
Americans,

http://www.centerformediaresearch.com/cfinr brief.cfm?fnl=040802;

at

Jennifer

Cheeseman Day and Kelly Holder, Voting and Registration in the Election of

November 2002, Figure 5 and Table D, available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2004pubs/p20-552.pdf; Thomas M. Durbin, Initiative, Referendum and
Recall: A Resume of State Provisions [19811 Rep. No. 81-63A (Cong. Research

Serv.); FAQ About Congress, at http://www.yourcongress.com/viewarticle
.asp?articleid=39 (last visited Jan. 20, 2005); Geoff Price, In Depth Analysis of
American Income and Taxation, at http://www.rationalrevolution.nettamerican-

incometaxation.htm (last updated Nov. 17, 2004). This discrepancy might
explain why Congress passed the original Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No.
104-99, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified and amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1, 28 U.S.C. §
1738C (1996)) even though younger Americans are four times more likely to
support same-sex marriage than those over 65. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mehren,
Poll Finds Society Becoming More Accepting of Gays, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA,

Apr. 11, 2004, at lB. One researcher concludes that in the near future, many
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Citizens of other nations have eyed the U.S. initiative process
with envy, recognizing that initiatives give voters the opportunity
"to directly affect public policy at the ballot box without having to
rely on the whims of an elected representative."8 9 The European
Union recommends referenda and popular initiatives: "[Tihe right of
citizens to have their say in major decisions on long-term or
virtually irreversible commitments involving a majority of citizens is
one of the democratic principles common to all member States of the
Council of Europe."9 0 Furthermore, in response to a sense of
"disempowerment of the individual European citizen," some
commentators have proposed a citizen initiative process that would
allow all citizens of the European Union to vote on Union-wide
legislation at the same time they vote in the elections for the
European Parliament. 9'
ii. Responding When the Legislative Process Fails. In
addition to promoting democracy, the initiative process is most
beneficial in addressing situations "where the ordinary machinery of
legislation [has] utterly failed."2 Sometimes this failure may be due
to inefficiency of the legislative process, in which case the initiative
can serve as "[a] legislative battering ram which may be used to tear
through the exasperating tangle of the traditional legislative
procedure and strike directly toward the desired end."9'
concerns about gay rights "are simply not going to be issues any longer" because
of a "huge change" between generations in their attitudes toward gays. Id.
(quoting Gary Gates, demographer at the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C.).
89.

Nate Hendley, Could Ballot Initiatives Work in Canada?,PUNDIT MAG.,

Nov. 7, 2000 (copy on file with author).
90. Recommendation of the Comm. of Ministers to Member States on
Referendums and Popular Initiatives at Local Level, Rec. No. R(96)2 (1996),
available at https://wcd.coe.intlViewDoc.jsp?id=548531&BackColorlnternet=
B9BDEE&BackColorIntranet=FFCD4F&BackColorLogged=FFC679.
91. J.H.H. Weiler, THE SELLING OF EUROPE: THE DISCOURSE OF EUROPEAN
CITIZENSHIP IN THE IGC 1996 (The Jean Monnet Program Working Papers
Series), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/96/9603.html
(last visited Jan. 28, 2005). "There is no civic act of the European citizen where
he or she can influence directly the outcome of any policy choice facing the
Community and Union as citizens can when choosing between parties which
offer sharply distinct programmes." Id. at 19.
92. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
583 P.2d 1281, 1289 (Cal. 1978).
93. Id. (quoting KEY & CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN
CALIFORNIA 485 (1939)). See also, William D. McCrackan, The Swiss
Referendum: The Ideal Republican Government, 15 COSMOPOLITAN 329-33 (July
1893) reprinted in

DEBATERS' HANDBOOK SERIES, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE

at 81 (Edith M. Phelps ed., 1909) (demanding
"business methods in making laws" because the business of legislators was
simply "to oppose and obstruct each other at all hazards").
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM,
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The initiative process is perhaps most useful, however, when
representatives fail to pass legislation due to forces beyond the
merits of the legislation itself. Bribes to legislators are an obvious
example of such a force. Early initiative proponents were gratified
that once voter oversight in the form of initiatives became part of
their constitution, "we have had no charter-mongers or railway
speculators, no wild-cat schemes, submitted to our legislature."94
Even without the potential for bribes, legislators' decisions are
often influenced by personal factors other than the merits of
legislation, most notably the desire to remain in office. It is no
surprise then that many ballot initiatives have addressed areas in
which legislators have refused to act for reasons of self-interest.
One of the earliest examples is women's suffrage. Although this
reform eventually succeeded as a constitutional amendment,
supporters originally advocated it through initiatives.9" Similarly,
term limits and campaign spending reforms, which do not favor
incumbents, have had much more success through the initiative
96
process than through legislatures.
iii. Social experimentation. Ballot initiatives also provide a
mechanism for experimentation on important social issues. Some
issues, particularly controversial social issues, can have a difficult
time surmounting the legislative process. Yet for other issues
sanctioning actions that do not harm others, it is appropriate for
voters to use "their traditional right through direct legislation [to]
override the views of their elected representatives as to what serves
the public interest."97
In such experimental areas, legislative inertia may be driven by
controversy over a topic. Because their voting records are public
information, legislators often are unwilling to put controversial
matters up for a vote, fearing repercussions from their political
party or from strong interest groups when seeking reelection. In
94. Eltweed Pomeroy, Democratic vs. Aristocratic Government, 28 ARENA
119-24 (1902) (quoting the then-governor of South Dakota whose party opposed
the direct legislation amendment), reprinted in THE DEBATERS' HANDBOOK
SERIES, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM,

at 39 (Edith M.

Phelps ed., 1909).
95. See O'Connor, supra note 8, at 663.

96. Even skeptics agree that "[slome matters such as term limits, campaign
finance regulation, redistricting, and other election law proposals are
appropriate for the initiative process." Hasen, supra note 7, at 564.
97. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 678 (9th Cir.
1976) (quoting S. Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, California,
424 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970)). The Eastlake Court noted that when the
people exercised their direct vote, they were exercising "a power reserved by the
people to themselves." Id. at 675.
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contrast, citizen voters, who are not motivated by a desire to be
reelected, are more likely to "vote their conscience"98 on such
experimental measures.
Similarly, it is best to deal with such experimental measures at
a state or local level. "[T]he Constitution's distinction between
national and local authority" was designed "so that the people's
rights would be secured by the division of power."99 When the
federal government preempts state efforts to conduct social
experiments, "the state is powerless to remove the ill effects of [that]
Thus, preemption can curtail valuable social
decision." 00
experiments initiated by the people.
Sometimes these efforts result in a national consensus where
none previously existed. They can signal to federal legislatures that
there is widespread support for a particular measure or, just as
important, widespread opposition. State ballot initiatives have, for
example, involved issues relating to campaign finance disclosure
and reform, restrictions on the use of nuclear power, and support for
the environment.
Moreover, in the absence of a national consensus, ballot
initiatives provide a mechanism for allowing communities to control
the resolution of important local issues. As the Supreme Court
stated in recognizing one of the benefits of ballot initiatives, "a
decentralized government ... will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous society." '°'

b.

Criticisms
Ballot initiatives have also been subject to considerable

98. IRI POST ELECTION REPORT, supra note 69, at 1.
99. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (arguing that federal regulation in the area of medical marijuana
use is inappropriate under basic principles of federalism and is best left to the
states), quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 n.7 (2000); see
also S. Candice Hoke, TranscendingConventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction
of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 890 (1992) ("Even in the area
of civil rights, it is no longer apparent that federal law will afford individuals
more protection than the laws of their states.").
100. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 643
(1973) (5-4 decision) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Penn. Dairies, Inc. v.
Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943)). In contrast, if Congress is
unhappy with a court's finding that state law may stand, it can enact new
legislation because "the national government, which has the ultimate power,
remains free to remove the burden." Id. (quoting Penn. Dairies, 318 U.S. at
275).
101. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that a
decentralized government "increases [the] opportunity for citizen involvement
in democratic processes").
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criticism. They can, for example, be a vehicle for the majority to use
its authority to deprive the minority of rights. In addition, voters
can be uninformed, particularly when the proposal is complex.
Furthermore, some have contended that the outcome of ballot
initiatives is excessively influenced by money. Finally, because
initiatives allow direct citizen action, they do not serve well for
issues that benefit from the deliberative process of a legislature.
One of the most
Majority Tyranny Over Minorities.
i.
serious criticisms of ballot initiatives is that they can reflect the
majority's hidden biases with impunity and at the expense of
minority rights.1 0 2 Some of the earliest initiatives were directed at
restricting the rights of Japanese immigrants,' 0 while more recent
measures have focused on Hispanic immigrants 0 4 and gays. 10 5 This

history of minority oppression by initiative" and the existence of
102. Bell, supra note 6, at 14-15. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
address the role of initiatives in the context of minority rights, but several other
scholars have looked at this topic. See, e.g., Symposium, The Bill of Rights vs.
the Ballot Box: Constitutional Implications of Anti-Gay Ballot Initiatives, 55
OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1994); Symposium, Redirected Democracy: An Evaluation of

the Initiative Process, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 391 (1998); supra note 6. Yet,
some of these arguments ignore the dual nature of legislation. If certain groups
"win" an initiative measure by a majority vote, the "losers" can categorize
themselves as a minority. While sometimes the majority may be motivated by
prejudice against the minority, it may equally be voting to uphold normative
principles to which it is deeply committed. Vargas, supra note 6. For example,
Professor Vargas categorizes the initiatives in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971), a low-income housing case, and in Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 668, a multifamily housing case, as having "a racial impact by enabling white majorities to
limit the encroachment of racial and poor minorities into their homogeneous
communities." Vargas, supra note 6, at 479. While it may be true that housing
developments would encourage inclusion of minorities and the poor, others have
argued that they actually drive these groups out. See, e.g., Chuck Plunkett,
War on Poverty Scatters the Poor, THE DENVER POST, Mar. 21, 2004, at Al.

103. See, for example, Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 332 (1923); Porterfield v.
Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 231 (1923); and Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 319 (1923),
all of which address application of the California Alien Land Law, an initiative
approved by voters in 1920 that had the effect of prohibiting ownership of land
by Japanese.
104. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 43
(1997) (ordering dismissal of a constitutional challenge to a ballot initiative that
made English Arizona's official language).
105. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996). Romer involved a
Colorado ballot initiative prohibiting "special protection" for homosexuals. The
Supreme Court held that homosexuals were not a protected class under the
equal protection clause, so strict scrutiny was not mandated. Id. at 631.
However, the ballot initiative failed to pass constitutional muster under a
rational basis test. Id. at 635.
106. Vargas, supra note 6, at 424-25 (arguing that minority rights "lose" in 4
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constitutional protections for individual rights would make it
inadvisable to advocate any less scrutiny °7 for initiative measures
when determining whether a law violates citizens' constitutional
rights.108

In many ways, these concerns over individual rights and the
will of the majority were the same as those raised by the founders.
The solution then and now was largely to withdraw most issues
affecting individual rights and liberties from the democratic process.
The Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment contain provisions
designed to protect individual rights. As a result, such rights cannot
be reduced by majority will.
out of five situations, but that the definition of a minority right may vary
depending on ideological conflicts).
107. Some have suggested a stricter standard of review for ballot measures,
but federal courts have refused to impose stricter standards in constitutional
contexts. See, e.g., Vargas, supra note 6, at 527. Vargas bases her argument for
strict scrutiny on a categorization of some initiatives as addressing minority
interests, thus triggering equal protection. Vargas, supra note 6, at 407 n.27;
see also Eule, supra note 5, at 1522-30 (suggesting a heightened scrutiny which
is a structural disadvantage to a form of direct democracy that does not filter
out majority-minority hostility); Symposium, The Bill of Rights vs. the Ballot
Box: The Constitutionality of Anti-Gay Ballot Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491
(1994); Mark Tushnet, Fearof Voting: Differential Standardsof Judicial Review
of Direct Legislation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373, 373-76 (1997); Marc Slonim &
James H. Lowe, Comment, Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote,
55 WASH. L. REV. 175, 176 (1979). But note the Ninth Circuit's response in
Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 862-63 (1997), reh'g granted, 129 F.3d 494 (9th
Cir. 1997), rev'd on othergrounds en banc, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that states are required under procedural due process to safeguard initiatives to
ensure citizens' constitutional rights are not infringed as a result of the vote).
108. As Thomas Jefferson wrote: "In questions of power, then, let no more be
heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of
the Constitution." ALPHEUS T. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: PALLADIUM OF
FREEDOM 10 (1962) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has noted that any
suggestion "the people" should not be similarly bound by the restrictions of the
Constitution was "astonishing." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, at 809 n.19 (1995). The Court stated that "[tihe dissent attacks our
holding today by arguing that the Framers' distrust of the States extended only
to measures adopted by 'state legislatures,' and not to measures adopted by 'the
people themselves.'. . . The novelty and expansiveness of the dissent's attack is
quite astonishing." Id. ("We are aware of no case that would even suggest that
the validity of a state law under the Federal Constitutionwould depend at all on
whether the state law was passed by the state legislature or by the people
directly through amendment of the state constitution." (emphasis added)). This
conclusion is consistent with another oft-quoted Supreme Court statement: "It
is irrelevant that the voters rather than a legislative body enacted [this law]
because the voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot
measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation." Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981).
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The analysis shifts, however, when moving from a
constitutional framework to a preemption context. The issue then
becomes

whether

initiatives

"[aire

.

.

.

more

likely

than

representative processes to produce laws that disadvantage . . .
minorities."'0 9 Commentators have concluded just the opposite. One
notes: "The history of the initiative is remarkably free of the
Another notes that the
enactment of abusive legislation."1 '
deliberative process does not systematically create fewer
discriminatory laws."' Furthermore, the legislative system creates
incentives for representatives to vote for discriminatory measures
even if they would not have done so in an anonymous plebiscite."'
Finally, another points out that "it is legislators, not the electorate,
who have enacted the bulk of

.

.

. laws that used to prohibit

miscegenation [and] laws that penalize homosexual sodomy while
ignoring heterosexual sodomy.""'
ii. Voter confusion. Some critics have argued that initiatives
are not good indicators of public will because many are confusing
and too complex for most voters."4 To support this argument, some
commentators performed word analyses on several measures placed
on the Oregon and California ballots during the 1970s. These
analyses showed the measures were written at a graduate school
level. " 5

These readability scales are not clear indicators of voter
comprehension in legal settings. Because they are based, in part, on
the length of words and sentences, they can produce artificially high
readings for legal text involving longer words and less common, but
legally significant, terms. Furthermore, while comprehensibility
may be a concern for more complex measures, it does not justify

109. Baker, supra note 6, at 709.
110. Ronald J. Allen, The National Initiative Proposal: A Preliminary
Analysis, 58 NEB. L. REv. 965, 1021 (1979). Alan Hirsch also notes:
Indeed, a tiny percentage of proposed initiatives are aimed at
restricting civil rights, and most of these are defeated. Citizens have
used direct democracy less to oppress vulnerable minorities than to (i)
reform government processes through campaign finance laws,
restrictions on lobbying, and conflict of interest statutes, (ii) restrict
their tax burden, and (iii) protect the environment."
Hirsch, supra note 81, at 206-07 n.110 (citations omitted).
111. Baker, supra note 6, at 737-52.
112. Id.
113. Gillette, supra note 4, at 621 (noting the difficulty of determining
whether this "is attributable to a heartfelt concern for traditional institutions"
or simply the result of "invidious prejudice").
114. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 3; Eule, supra note 5.
115. MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 118.
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invalidation of all initiatives as being beyond the ken of voters.
In addition, a number of initiative reforms enacted in more
recent years have specifically addressed the issue of voter confusion.
Single-subject limits help shorten ballot questions and decrease the
potential for manipulation."6 Other popular reforms are ballot
information booklets and newspaper notices sponsored by the
government. These tools attempt to provide "fair and impartial
analysis of each measure" prepared by "nonpartisan research staff of
the general assembly"' so the electorate can be better educated on
measures.
Finally, the potential for confusion is not unique to initiative
measures; the same problem exists with laws adopted by a
As the Court has noted: "If this test [requiring
legislature.
understanding of the laws they adopted] were applied literally to
every member of any legislature that ever voted
8 on a law, there
would be very few laws which would survive it.""
Consequently, state courts "indulge in a presumption that the
voters thoroughly study and understand the content" of initiatives" 9
and have refused to impose an "ignorant voter clause" 2 ° in the
Constitution or a common-law rule that certain issues are too
difficult for voters to understand. 21 Furthermore, even detractors of
116. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 3, at 88. Colorado citizens passed a
single-subject rule by referendum in the 1994 election. The legislation
accompanying the referendum states that the single-subject rule is intended
"I[to prevent surreptitious measures and [to] apprise the people of the subject of
each measure .. . to prevent surprise and fraud." COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40106.5(1)(e)(II) (2003).
117. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(7.5)(a) (amended 1994), quoted in
Collins & Oesterle, supra note 3, at 99.
118. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). The majority
stated: "W]e have historically assumed that Congress intended what it
enacted." Id. See also Gillette, supra note 4, at 610.
119. Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices
Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220, 1235 (Cal. 1990); see also Olson v. Sec'y of State, 689
A.2d 605, 608 (Me. 1997) (assuming "the voters have discharged their civic duty
to educate themselves about the initiative"); but see Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d
839, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g granted, 129 F.3d 494 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd on
other grounds en bane, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (invalidating a California
term limits initiative on grounds of voter ignorance). An en banc panel of the
Ninth Circuit overturned the first decision, but on grounds that did not confront
the reasoning of the initial panel. Bates, 131 F.3d at 843.
120. A judge in the Bates case noted: "Searching the Constitution, however, I
am unable to locate an 'ignorant voter clause' that vests federal courts with the
power to review voter-enacted legislation to ensure that enough people were
capable of understanding what they had voted for ... " Bates, 131 F.3d at 853
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
121. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Quick, 930 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App. 1996), affd
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ballot initiatives admit that the possibility of confusion or
unrepresentative results "depends on the nature of the issue." 2
Even though there are instances where voters have been confused or
misled, 23 in many circumstances, initiatives "undoubtedly were fair
indicators of public sentiment."1 2 4 In addition, when "one discrete
issue [is put] to the voters,"'2' courts 26can have more confidence that
will.
the vote represents the people's

Influence of Money. The nature of issues addressed is
iii.
also relevant to the concern of money's "corrosive effect" on the
Although federal courts have been
initiative process. 1272
unsympathetic to this complaint,' some commentators have opined
that money is a significant and troubling influence in the outcome of
Yet, research suggests that campaign
initiative elections. 29
spending has less impact when initiatives address certain topics.
Factors such as "the strength of initial public support for a
measure" 30 and "the merits of the issues"'' can be much more
important than money in shaping electoral outcomes in direct
legislation campaigns. 2 Thus, critics have acknowledged that many

in part, rev'd and modified in part, 7 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 1998).
122. Eule, supra note 5, at 1518.

123. Id., at 1517-18 (describing specific campaigns such as Occidental
Petroleum's Proposition P, which appeared to oppose offshore drilling but
actually mandated Occidental's onshore drilling).
124. Id., at 1518 (citing Wolfinger & Greenstein, The Repeal of FairHousing
in California:An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 753,

754-58 (1968) (suggesting that voters' repeal of California's fair housing
legislation accurately reflected underlying attitudes)). Eule further notes that

"[elven considerable confusion need not necessarily undermine the accuracy of
ballot voting as a gauge of majority preferences." Id., at 1519.

125. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at the Local Level, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259, 266 (1977).

126. Even critics have agreed -that when registering views on "a single
issue," the initiative can be very effective for measuring the majority's
preference. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 5, at 1514 n.40 (citing Cass R. Sunstein,
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1144
(1986)).
127. Smith, supra note 4, at 71.
128. Id., at 86-88.

129. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 145-51; ZISK, supra note 4;
Lowenstein, supra note 4; Smith, supra note 4, at 71; Mastro, supra note 4;
Shockley, supra note 4.

130.

SCHMIDT,

supranote 25, at 36.

131. Charles Price, Initiative Campaigns:Afloat on a Sea of Cash, 19 CAL. J.
481,482 (1988).
132. See, e.g., John Owens & Larry Wade, CampaignSpending on California
Ballot Propositions:Trends and Voting Effects, 1924-1984, 39 WEST. POL. Q. 675
(1986), cited in Smith, supra note 4, at 83.
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initiatives are true indicators of the people's will.'33
134
Nor is the problem of money limited to ballot initiatives.
Legislators are vulnerable

to special interests,'135 and there is

evidence that higher campaign contributors are able to reap the
benefits of favorable legislation. In contrast, infusions of cash can
kill a ballot measure by swaying public sentiment against it. Yet,
unlike legislators who personally benefit from infusions of additional
money to their campaigns, the voters receive no direct reward, and
there is no evidence that "big money [can] always buy a 'yes' vote.1 36
Thus, while financial reform is a hotly debated problem that plagues
our entire governmental system, there is an argument that its
influence may be less problematic in the initiative setting.
iv.
Interference with the Legislative Process. Sometimes
initiatives can interfere with legislatures by tying their hands. For
example, in Colorado, a budget crisis resulted from a tax limitation
initiative that restricts the legislature's ability to raise or spend
revenues. 3" These restrictions were especially problematic in the
face of another citizen initiative addressing education financing that
required set funding for state elementary schools.'39 State officials
often avoid such conflicts by using discretion in implementing
initiative mandates.'40 Legislatures also have the opportunity to ask
voters to remedy such situations through referenda. Yet, the
political forces that initially lead voters to turn to the initiative
process often discourage the same unresponsive legislators from
taking action. Finally, fiscal matters involve complex issues that
133.

MAGLEBY,

supra note 3, at 176 ("To a surprising extent, ideological self-

classification appears to determine voting behavior.").
134. Researchers have concluded that the corrosive impact of money is an
issue in the initiative context but not necessarily more so than for
representative

government.

See

CALIFORNIA COMM'N

ON

CAMPAIGN FIN.,

DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE 265-91 (1992).

135. Gillette, supra note 4, at 622-25.
136. Al Knight, Do Initiatives Still Work? Yes, but They Need Some Repair,
DENVER POST, Dec. 1, 2002, at 1E ("[Blig money can kill a ballot measure. But
the corresponding good news is that big money can't always buy a 'yes' vote.").
For example, moneyed interests supporting election-related measures in
Colorado's 2002 election poured millions into the campaigns, yet the initiatives
they supported "were defeated easily." Id. ("Millions were spent on some
election-related issues this year. .. but those initiatives were defeated easily.").
137. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Citizens Against Rent Control
v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1997).
138. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20 (Taxpayer's Bill of Rights).
139. See Chris Frates, Panel Kills Another Plan to Fix Conflicting Fiscal
Amendments, DENVER POST, Apr. 29, 2004.
140. See, e.g.,

ELIZABETH R. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE (2001).
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require balancing competing interests, and as a result, some states
limit the initiative power in this area.1
Other critics have argued that initiatives are inferior because
they do not have the benefit of the deliberative process required for
laws made by legislatures. 42 First, this argument presumes that in
"generat[ing] superior laws," 43 the legislators actually deliberate.
The reality of the law-making process is not as tidy as idealists
suggest. Many legislators neither participate in debate nor read the
bills,'4 so their votes are as much, or more, based on party pressures
and the desires of major campaign contributors as they are on firmly
held personal convictions.
The electorate self-selects in determining its ability to
understand ballot measures. While some voters choose not to vote
at all on initiatives, 6 those who do vote are better educated and
more informed about issues.1 ' Furthermore, an initiative must
survive a rigorous elimination process to become law. In general,
voters are more skeptical about initiative measures, and there is a
strong "negative bias "141 or tendency to vote "no." For example, in
California between 1912 and 2002, less than 25% of the 1,187
initiatives circulated made the ballot. In addition, those initiatives
that qualified for the California ballot failed at a rate of 66% to
92%.' 4 Consequently, while initiative measures do not pass through
141. Smith, supra note 4.
142. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 5, at 1520, 1527, 1555; Elizabeth Garrett,
Who Directs Direct Democracy?, U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE, 1997, at 20; Hans
A. Linde, On Reconstituting "RepublicanGovernment", 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
193, 206 (1994) ("When groups or individuals can bypass deliberative bodies
and enact these passions by plebiscite, the state departs from republican
lawmaking.").
143. Gillette, supra note 4, at 629 (arguing that "deliberation is highly
overrated as a basis for decision making; thus deliberation in the legislature
does not necessarily generate superior laws").

144.

AMAR

& HIRSCH, supra note 78, at 39.

As Germany's first chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck
145. See, e.g., id.
famously quipped: "Laws are like sausages, it is better not to see them being
made." Bismarck, available at http://www.worldofquotes.com/author/Otto-VonBismark/l/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
146. See MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 100-01 (observing "voter dropoff': 15% to
18% of those who turn out for an election do not vote on ballot propositions).
147. CRONIN, supra note 25, at 77.
148. MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 67 (noting that the vote on legislatively
sponsored measures is more often positive, while most citizen-initiated
measures are defeated).
149. The 66% fail rate is based on data from Secretary of State Kevin
Shelley. KEVIN SHELLEY, A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES 9 (2002),
available at www.ss.ca.gov/elections/init-history.pdf. The 92% fail rate is based
on information from political scientist Dave McCuan. IRI POST ELECTION
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a legislative filter that allows deliberation and amendment, the risk
that voters who do not like a provision will vote down the entire
initiative serves a comparable filtering function. Thus, despite the
attention attracted by controversial measures, overall the results of
ballot initiatives tend to favor the status quo.150
3. Ballot Initiatives WarrantingSpecial Deference
The previous litany of benefits and criticisms illustrates why
initiatives have often been controversial. Because they can vary
dramatically both in form and by topic area, initiatives defy
universal categorizations. Yet, because the initiative vehicle creates
a process that allows citizens to circumvent recalcitrant legislatures,
it deserves special treatment in circumstances where the legislative
process has often failed.
Initiative opponents have carved out exceptions to their
criticisms. They acknowledge that the initiative process is beneficial
in addressing term limits, campaign finance regulation,
redistricting, and other election law proposals because legislatures
are particularly poor at establishing "rules for their own competitive
processes."' 51 This Article carves out another category for which the
initiative process is especially suited. Such initiatives represent an
alignment of factors: (a) topic areas that have traditionally been
regulated by the states, such as health and safety; (b) good
candidates for experimentation at the state level when there is no
need for national uniformity; and (c) matters that expand the rights
of individuals without infringing on the rights of others.'5 2 These
situations represent those in which initiatives are a valuable tool for
responding to the people's needs in the face of immutable federal or
state legislatures. If measures are taken to minimize the risks and
maximize the potential of initiatives, direct democracy can be a
valuable tool 3to allow citizen participation in appropriate areas of
government. 15

supra note 69. The 100-year average failure rate for initiatives
nationwide is 59%. Id.
150. MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 167. See also Maimon Schwarzschild,
REPORT,

Popular Initiatives and American Federalism, or, Putting Direct Democracy in
its Place, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 531, 540 n.15 (citing JOHN M. ALLSWANG,

1898-1998, app. A, at 264-69
(2000)).
151. Hasen, supra note 7, at 564 (citing Clark, supra note 6, at 482).
152. This Article addresses a preemption standard for only those initiatives
that satisfy all three of these factors. It is possible that an argument can be
made for adding additional categories, but it is beyond the scope of this Article.
153. Hirsch, supranote 81, at 186.
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA
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a. Matters of Health and Safety
Whatever argument can be made about the benefits of ballot
initiatives in general, a strong case can be made about their
usefulness in developing consensus and encouraging debate on
social issues arising in the context of health and safety. Health and
safety have long been recognized as some of the strongest interests
reserved by the states. This has been particularly true in the
context of the regulation of medical practices. As the Supreme
Court has noted: "It is elemental that a state has broad power...
relative to the health
of everyone there. It is a vital part of a state's
54
police power."

1

During Prohibition, there was a debate whether the federal
government could interfere with traditional state power to control
medical practice. In Lambert v. Yellowley," the Supreme Court
held that the 18th Amendment, which permitted the federal
government to control alcohol, also conferred power upon the federal
government to restrict physicians' use of alcohol to treat their
patients. Four Justices dissented. They noted that Congress's
efforts "directly invaded" the "reserved power of the states to control
the practice of medicine." 6
While a constitutional amendment certainly creates sufficient
power for the federal government to regulate in areas traditionally
reserved to the states, the split in the Lambert Court reflects the
conviction, still articulated in decisions today, that health and safety
matters warrant special protection from federal intrusion. 157 A
number of ballot initiatives in past years have addressed health and
safety issues. One category-medical
marijuana-will serve as the
158
case study for this Article.

154. Barsky v. Bd.of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449, 451 (1954) (upholding New
York's authority to discipline a doctor for conviction of a crime in another state
by suspending his license to practice and noting that "practice" is a privilege
granted by the state "under its substantially plenary power").
155. 272 U.S. 581 (1926) (5-4 decision).
156. Id. at 603 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (explaining that only five Justices
supported federal legislation restricting the ability of physicians to prescribe
alcohol to patients except in limited doses); see also Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368
F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Obviously, direct control of medical practice in
the states is beyond the power of the federal government.") (quoting Linder v.
United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)).
157. See discussion of the presumption against preemption in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
158. Ballot initiatives surrounding medical marijuana have been proposed
and passed in several states. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Other
health and safety issues not addressed in this Article include physician-assisted
suicide, stem-cell research, and genetically modified foods.
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Matters of Social Experimentation

One of the advantages of ballot initiatives is that they can be a
mechanism for the people to get action when legislatures are
unwilling to respond for social or political reasons. As Theodore
Roosevelt noted: "I believe in the Initiative and Referendum, which
should be used not to destroy representative government, but to
correct it whenever it becomes misrepresentative. ""9 Consequently,
the initiative process is especially appropriate in situations where
social experimentation is advisable to help reach national consensus
on controversial issues.
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of allowing
states to experiment on social issues,6 particularly in the field of
health and safety. In Washington v. Glucksberg,"' the Court
considered the constitutionality of a Washington statute that
banned assisted suicide. The Court could have stopped the debate
by determining that assisted suicide was a liberty interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, but it declined to do So.162 Instead,

the Glucksberg Court upheld Washington's statute, recognizing the
tension created when public "lattitudes toward suicide itself have
changed

.

. . but our laws have consistently condemned, and

continue to prohibit, assisting suicide."'63 As the Justices noted:
"[Tlhe States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful
examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar
issues. " 164 Furthermore, the Court noted that its holding 16"permits
this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." 5

159. President Theodore Roosevelt, Address Before the Ohio Constitutional
Convention (Feb. 12, 1912).
160. See, e.g., New State Ice-Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis stated:
Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the
limitations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social
and economic science; and to the discouragement to which proposals
for betterment there have been subjected otherwise. There must be
power in the states and the nation to remould, through
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet
changing social and economic needs. I cannot believe that the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the states which ratified it,
intended to deprive us of the power to correct the evils of technological
unemployment and excess productive capacity which have attended
progress in the useful arts.
Id. (citations omitted).
161. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
162. Id. at 723.
163. Id. at 719.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 735 (emphasis added). If the Glucksberg Court had decided that
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Similarly, in United States v. Oakland CannabisBuyers' Coop.,
a case addressing California's ballot initiative creating a medical
necessity defense for using medical marijuana, Justice Stevens
observed the value of permitting state-level experimentation. In a
concurring opinion, he noted:
[RIespect [for the sovereign states] imposes a duty on federal
courts, whenever possible, to avoid or minimize conflict
between federal and state law, particularly in situations in
which the citizens of a State have chosen to "serve as a
laboratory" in the trial of "novel social and
66 economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.'1
Ballot initiatives are appropriate vehicles for addressing these
experimental topics because legislatures are often paralyzed by the
lack of consensus on these issues. Yet, consensus often cannot be
experimentation.
this
allowing
first
without
achieved
Experimentation at the local level is especially useful because of the
low risk to others. Consequently, ballot initiatives should be
permitted to stand unless there is a compelling need for national
uniformity on a topic.
Ballot initiatives historically have played a key role in such
social experimentation. Many social reforms have and continue to
germinate through the initiative process. In addition to the health
reforms listed in the previous section, initiatives have frequently
167
and
addressed experimental topics such as animal protection
66
environmental issues. Campaign reforms, tax reforms, and health
care reforms have also frequently started at the state level through
ballot initiatives. 169
assisted suicide was a protected right, then the debate would have been
resolved. In a subsequent case on assisted suicide, the Ninth Circuit was
explicit in "tak[ing] no position on the merits or morality" of the issue. Oregon
v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004).
166. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 502
(2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932)) (emphasis added).
167. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1692.2 (2002) (codifying Question No. 687
in 2002 which approved a ban on cockfighting in Oklahoma); INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM INST., STATEWIDE INITIATIVES (MASS.), at http://www.iandrinstitute

.org/Massachusetts.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005) (noting the failure of a
November 2000 ballot initiative to ban dog racing in the state).
168. For example, environmental initiatives have included the labeling of
genetically modified food in Oregon and a water pollution control bond in
Maine. IRI POST ELECTION REPORT, supra note 69.
169. See
INITIATIVE

generally INITIATIVE
AND

REFERENDUM

&

REFERENDUM

ELECTIONS,

ballotwatch.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).

at

INSTITUTE,

STATEWIDE

http://www.iandrinstitute.org/
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c.
UnderstandableMatters ProtectingRather than Infringing
Individual Rights
This Article addresses a heightened presumption against
preemption only for ballot initiatives that meet the criteria in this
section: understandable, experimental health and safety issues that
protect individual rights. It does not advocate any special deference
for ballot initiatives that find their way into federal courts on
grounds that the initiatives interfere with individual rights
protected by the Constitution170
In those situations, it is
appropriate for the courts to review potential violations rigorously,
with no particular deference. However, the initiatives defined in
this section do not infringe on individual rights, so if they face
challenges under federal law, the only issue would be possible
conflict with a preexisting federal statute. The initiatives addressed
by this Article are those that reflect the benefits of the initiative
process without suffering from the harms attached to some more
problematic initiative measures. First, they are not those that
oppress any minority interests.
Instead, they seek to permit
individuals to exercise an expanded category of personal rights free
from intrusion by federal legislation.1
Second, voters typically comprehend measures that qualify for
federal deference. The wording of both Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act. 2 and California's Proposition 215 is readable for high school
graduates. 3 Oregon's Act passed in 1994, and a measure to repeal

170. For example, initiatives such as the Colorado ballot measure struck
down on equal protection grounds by the Supreme Court in Romer should not
receive deference. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (holding that
Amendment 2, a Colorado ballot measure that prevented localities from
enacting laws that prevented discrimination against homosexuals, failed to pass
a rational relation test for equal protection).
171. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723-24 (1997). In
Glucksberg, the Supreme Court stated that there is no fundamental
constitutional right to commit suicide. However, applying heightened deference
to ballot initiatives addressing this topic might protect the individuals from
intrusion by federal legislation. Furthermore, if the Civil War "Amendments
were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on
state sovereignty" to permit the federal government to better protect the rights
of individual slaves from intrusion by state governments, then this federal
expansion should be abated when state governments might better protect the
rights of individuals through initiatives. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468
(1991) (quoting City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980)).
172.

OR. REV. STAT.

§§

127.800-.897 (2003).

173. A word analysis on the text of the Proposition, done using the FleschKincaid scale, showed a reading grade level of 12. The Flesch-Kincaid scale is a
standard scale available under most Microsoft Word spelling and grammar
check tools. See K.K. DuVivier, Writing Help at Your Fingertips-Readability

2005]

INITIATIVES IN THE PREEMPTIONEQUATION

253

it failed three years later."' California's Proposition 215 passed by
56% of the vote in 1996, and over the last decade, nationwide polls
have consistently shown between 60% and 80% of Americans
support legal access to medical marijuana. 175
Third, both assisted suicide and medical marijuana initiatives
represent deeply personal concepts about which voters have strong
opinions. While ordinary citizens might be confused by detailed
commercial regulations, allowing individuals to choose medication
or the manner in which they die are relatively straightforward.
Consequently, voters' opinions about such issues are less likely to be
swayed by moneyed interests. In addition, because they are more
grassroots personal issues, they are unlikely to attract large
commercial contributors.
Fourth, the deliberative process is less necessary for measures
such as Oregon's and California's because they are focused on a
single personal decision that does not require complex weighing of
multiple interests and issues. As the Supreme Court has noted,
direct citizen votes are especially helpful for "single-shot" situations
that "put one discrete issue to the voters."176
In summary, in a preemption context, the analysis shifts for
this special category of initiatives. In preemption, the relevant
inquiry is whether the shortcomings and deficiencies of the initiative
process are any more problematic than comparable shortcomings in
the representative process. 177 This category of ballot initiatives
Scale, 30 COLO.LAW. 39 (Mar. 2001).
174. In Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), the court
held that regulations issued by the U.S. Attorney General pursuant to authority
in the CSA could not be used to sanction physicians for assisting their patients'
suicides under the Oregon Death With Dignity Act. In making the decision, the
Ninth Circuit judges noted that because Oregon voters had twice voted to
legalize assisted suicide, upholding the initiative better promoted "the
democratic process." Id. at 1124. "We disagree with the dissent's suggestion
that this court, rather than the Attorney General, is interfering with the
democratic process." Id. On February 22, 2005, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to the case. Ashcroft v. Oregon, 2005 WL 405754 (No. 04-623).
175. David W. Moore, Americans Oppose General Legalization of Marijuana,
but Support Use for Medicinal Purposes, Gallup Poll News Service, Vol. 63, No.
44, Apr. 9, 1999, availableat http://www.gallup.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
A 2001 Pew Research poll found that 73% of American adults supported
permitting doctors to prescribe marijuana for their patients. THE PEW
RESEARCH

CTR. FOR

THE

PEOPLE

AND

THE

PRESS,

INTERDICTION

AND

21, 2001), available at http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=16 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
176. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action, 430 U.S. 259, 266 (1977).
177. See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government and Popular
Distrust: The Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum Regarding State
INCARCERATION STILL TOP REMEDIES (Mar.

ConstitutionalAmendment by Initiative Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 5, 14-
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ought to receive greater deference in preemption analysis,
particularly where they are designed to address social issues in the
absence of a national consensus. Such a presumption encourages
experimentation and seeks to limit the use of preemption to arrest
the process.
II.

PREEMPTION AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION

Experimentation through ballot initiatives involving health and
safety sometimes intersects with preexisting federal laws or
regulations in the same substantive area. Often the laws were
written without the subject of the ballot initiative in mind. To the
extent the federal statute preempts the ballot initiative, the
experimentation process may come to an end or be dramatically
curtailed.
A.

Preemption

The preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause,
which provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."79 In drafting the Constitution, the founders consciously
rejected "the British alternative of parliamentary supremacy."'8 0
15 (1992).
178. "[UJnder the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is
derived, 'any state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power,
which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.'" Gade v. Nat'l
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487
U.S. 131, 138 (1988)); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
516 (1992).
179. In relevant part, the Supremacy Clause states: "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "[Alcts of the State
Legislatures . . . [that] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress
[are to be invalidated because] . . . [i]n every such case, the act of Congress...
is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers
not controverted, must yield to it." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211
(1824).
180. Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Review and Its Alternatives: An American
Tale, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 415, 418 (2003). Furthermore, the founders
declined to adopt a model providing for congressional supremacy at the federal
level. Instead, the founders opted for a government based upon three
independent branches, each enjoying separate powers. "[T]he notion of
congressional supremacy had remarkably little support at the time." Id. at 421.
Minimizing any assumption that "Congress has the power to determine
conclusively the constitutionality of its own actions," the judicial branch became
arbiter for any such federal-state disputes. Id. "The 'arising under' clause and
the Supremacy Clause fairly clearly established ... that the Constitution is 'law'
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The Supremacy Clause arose out of the possibility of conflict
The Clause represented a
between state and federal law.
"mechanism for resolving specific clashes" by providing that federal
enactments would take precedence in any conflict.' As a result, the
clause does not constitute a separate grant of federal power 182 but
instead represents a "dispute resolution mechanism" between the
states and federal government. 8 ' Commentators have noted the
language of the Supremacy Clause is "process-oriented rather than
substantive" and that the Clause "cannot be properly read to confer
additional national powers irrespective of the substantive provisions
4
and limitations articulated in the balance of the Constitution."'s
The Supremacy Clause remained rarely invoked until the early
part of the twentieth century. As the federal government's influence
spread during the Progressive Era, the Court chose a simple formula
to resolve federal-state conflicts; it exercised a form of automatic
preemption, deferring to federal law in almost all instances. 85 In
the 1930s, however, the Court pulled up the reins on this automatic
preemption in the case of Mintz v. Baldwin.'8 6
Mintz involved a cattle-raising business that resisted a state
agricultural commissioner's order requiring additional certification
against diseases for herds imported into the state. 8 7 The business
argued that the state's additional requirement should be preempted
by federal acts addressing contagious diseases in cattle. 88 Instead,
the Supreme Court upheld the state's certification requirement by
finding there was no conflict because Congress had not clearly
expressed an intent to preempt any additional state regulation.' 89
Thus, Mintz shifted preemption analysis from automatic
preemption to a test based on congressional intent to preempt. In
ascertaining Congress's intent, courts look "to the plain language of
the statute, construing the provisions of the entire law."' 90 When
of a kind that courts are authorized to interpret." Id. (citations omitted).
181. Farber, supra note 180, at 419.
182. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
767, 774 (1994). Gardbaum argues preemption can go beyond the conflict
resolution power permitted by the Constitution when federal legislation
"deprive[s states] of their power to act at all in a given area." Id. at 771.
183. Id. at 774.
184. Hoke, supranote 99, at 833.
185. See Gardbaum, supranote 182, at 808.
186. 289 U.S. 346, 352 (1933) (requiring clear intent by Congress to
supersede or exclude state action to regulate the prevention of infectious cattle
diseases).
187. Id. at 347-48.
188. Id. at 348.
189. Id. at 350.
190. Yang v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 183 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1999).
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congressional intent is explicit in the language of a statute, the
courts may recognize express preemption.'9 ' Yet, even when a
statute contains express language, courts at times have consulted
extraneous sources in an effort to ascertain the scope of Congress's
intent to preempt.
In some situations, courts will imply preemption with any
language in a statute stating an intent to preempt. In these
situations, courts also use extraneous sources to find either conflict
or field preemption. 9 2 Conflict preemption arises "where compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or
where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 93 Field
preemption is more nebulous, allowing courts to recognize a
congressional intent to preempt simply through federal legislation
and regulations that are "so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
[them] ."'9

In determining whether Congress intended to preempt, intent
"primarily is discerned from the language of the preemption statute
and the 'statutory framework' surrounding it." 19 5 Thus, in addition

to the words in the statute, the courts will determine "the 'structure
and purpose of the statute as a whole' as revealed not only in the
text, but through the reviewing court's reasoned understanding of
the way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding
regulatory scheme to affect.., the law." 96
To reach this "reasoned understanding," courts have used a
variety of extrinsic sources beyond the text of a statute. Often
courts will look to legislative history as a valuable source, but they
also have considered congressional and agency regulatory schemes.
In addition, courts have included the statements of agency
191. For example, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 provided that "no
State . . . shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services
of any air carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272,
§7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994). This language was interpreted as expressly
preempting price advertising guidelines from the National Association of
Attorneys General because they related to "rates." Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992).
192. "Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and 'is compelled
whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."' Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes
Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, at 98 (1992) (citations omitted).
193. Id. (citations omitted).
194. Id. (citations omitted).
195. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (citations omitted).
196. Id. (citations omitted).
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administrators in their analysis of congressional intent to
preempt.197 Finally, in some instances, courts have considered not
only federal resources, but also, state-generated materials as pivotal
components in their determination whether preemption is
appropriate because federal and state purposes conflict.19
B.

The PresumptionAgainst Preemption

Although a court's stated goal in modern preemption analysis is
to discern congressional power or intent,' 9 the Mintz Court's shift to
an intent-based test actually marked a renewed recognition of state
power. The Mintz Court noted that federal intent "to supersede or
exclude state action ...is not lightly to be inferred. The intention to
do so must definitely and clearly appear.""0 Thus, Mintz reversed a
trend toward a presumption of automatic preemption and instead
20 1
recognized a new concept: a "presumption against preemption."
197. Some preemption cases have used federal agency materials to provide
context for their conclusions about Congress's intent to preempt. For example,
as part of its analysis, the Mintz Court referenced a letter to the defendant from
the Department of Agriculture. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 349 (1933)
(referencing a November 15, 1932 letter from the Department of Agriculture
saying that "its policy for the present is to leave the control with the various
states"). Similarly, in Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,

Inc., a statement from the FDA indicating an intention not to preempt was a
significant factor in the Court's conclusion that pervasive federal regulations
governing the collection of blood plasma did not preempt local ordinances
addressing the same topic. 471 U.S. 707, 714-15 (1985).
198. See infra notes 252-57 and accompanying text.
199. "The question of whether a certain state action is preempted by federal
law is one of congressional intent." Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 (citations omitted).
200. Mintz, 289 U.S. at 350 (citing Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. R.R.
Comm'n, 283 U.S. 380, 391 (1931); Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118, 122
(1919); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912); Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry.
v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 623 (1898)). See also California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987), cited in Coalition for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1511 (1996).
201. Although Mintz marks the first case in the 1930s to reject the
preemption assumption, the "presumption against preemption" concept was
articulated earlier in New York Central Railroad Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147,

156 n.4 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Recent cases most commonly cite Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), for the proposition. See,

e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cippollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.
Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985). The Court later clarified that such a
presumption was consistent with the reservation of powers to the states and the
people under the Tenth Amendment. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230-31. "The
Constitution instead 'leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty,' reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment." New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (citations omitted).
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Although the presumption against preemption could apply to
any state legislation, the Court has limited it to areas involving
matters of "intimate concern" to states.2 2 This has generally meant
matters traditionally left to the states, particularly police powers.2 0 3
As the Court has observed: "In all preemption cases, and
particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated... in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied,' we 'start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act."' 20 4
Some cases applying the presumption have involved safety
issues.
In Maurer v. Hamilton, 5° the Court focused on the
traditional state interest of regulating safety. The Court refused to
consider a state statute addressing auto transport trucks
preempted, despite extensive federal regulation of trucking by the
Interstate Commerce Commission.20 6 Similarly, in Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, °7 the Court upheld a California
statute addressing maturity standards for avocados despite a direct
Under the
conflict with a comparable federal regulation.
presumption against preemption, the Court required an explicit
declaration from Congress before displacing traditional state
protection of food quality. 0 8

202. Rice, 331 U.S. at 241 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Specifically,
Frankfurter stated in his dissent:
Suffice it to say that due regard for our federalism, in its practical
operation, favors survival of the reserved authority of a State over
matters that are the intimate concern of the State unless Congress has

clearly swept the boards of all State authority, or the State's claim is
in unmistakable conflict with what Congress has ordered.
Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
203. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("The powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
204. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230) (emphasis
added); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass'n. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S.
Ct. 1756, 1765 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier,
501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991).
205. 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
206. In contrast, note that in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S 637 (1971), the
Court held the federal bankruptcy code preempted state motor vehicle public
responsibility legislation that would suspend the driver's license of a judgment
debtor.
207. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
208. Id. at 144. The Court examined the legislative scheme and its history,
and despite evidence of a desire for uniformity in the field of agricultural
regulation, concluded Congress must make an explicit declaration to displace
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In recent years, the Court has most vigorously applied the
presumption against preemption in the context of safety and health.
In Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,Inc., °
the Supreme Court refused to preempt local ordinances governing
the collection of blood. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted,
"[t]he regulation of health and safety matters is primarily and
historically a matter of local concern." 210 Similarly, in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr,1 Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of four, 2
determined that pre-market approvals by the Food and Drug
Administration did not preempt state common law design and
manufacturing defect claims for a pacemaker. In applying the
presumption against preemption, Justice Stevens noted "[the]
approach is consistent with both federalism concerns and the
historic 213primacy of state regulation of matters of health and
safety."

In contrast, the Supreme Court has not applied the
presumption when the Constitution granted authority for the
applicable topic area to the federal government. For example, in
Hines v. Davidowitz,1 4 the Court struck down a Pennsylvania law
that imposed special registration requirements for aliens. The
Court found no express intent by Congress to preempt this area, nor
did it find that the state law in any way conflicted or interfered with
federal law. Yet, it concluded that the federal government had
traditionally played a unique role in international relations and its
extensive regulations for aliens justified preemption of the
additional Pennsylvania requirements.2 15

state law.
209. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
210. Id. at 708.
211. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
212. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion. Justices Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens for the
portions of the decision quoted here. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion.
Justice O'Connor authored a concurrence and dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia. The dissent argued that the
analysis should not go beyond the express language of the statute. "Where the
language of the statute is clear, resort to the agency's interpretation is
improper." Id. at 511.
213. Id. at 485.
214. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
215. Id. at 66. "[T]he supremacy of the national power in the general field of
foreign affairs . . . is made clear by the Constitution .... ." Id. at 62. The
regulation of that field is "intimately blended and intertwined with
responsibilities of the national government." Id. at 66; see also Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968), cited in Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 719
(noting "we must look for special features warranting pre-emption").
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Similarly in 2003, the Court refused to apply the presumption
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal
in
against
C
•
• preemption
216
Commission. Buckman involved injured patients who filed claims
fraudulent
on the latter's
based
manufacturers
against
representations to the FDA in obtaining approval to market their
medical devices. Although the Court acknowledged the "historic
primacy of state regulation in matters of health and safety," it
denied the "fraud-on-the-FDA" claims.1 7 In doing so, the Court
noted that "the relationship between a federal agency and the entity
it regulates is inherently federal," and refused to apply the
presumption against preemption because "[p]olicing fraud against
federal agencies is hardly 'a field which the States have traditionally
occupied.' 218
Furthermore, the presumption has not been applied in areas
arising from the creation of the federal government.1 9 Initiatives
that addressed elections of federal representatives, 20 balancing the
federal budget,22 and creating a federal initiative process 222 were
struck down because they strayed into these exclusively federal
areas. In addition, state courts invalidated initiatives attempting to
an
create a process for amending the federal Constitution 2as
itsef 2 1
Constitution
the
in
forth
set
procedure
the
to
alternative
C.

Applying the PresumptionAgainst Preemption

The presumption against preemption can be applied in a way
that recognizes certain types of state enactments deserve greater
deference. In its most rigorous form, the presumption requires
courts to do more than standard statutory analysis, which requires
an effort to discern congressional intent. Instead, it reflects a
presumption that a state enactment will be allowed to stand
alongside potentially conflicting federal law. As Justice Souter

216. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
217. Id. at 347-48 (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 347 (citation omitted).
219. The presumption does not apply to new rights arising from the
Constitution's creation of a federal government and elected representatives for
that government. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
779-80 (1995) ("[Ihe power to add qualifications [for federal representatives] is
not within the States' pre-Tenth Amendment 'original powers,' but is a new
right arising from the Constitution itself, and thus is not reserved.").
220. Id.; see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 510-11 (2001).
221. See, e.g., State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 828 (Mont.
1984).
222. See, e.g., Philadelphia II v. Gregoire, 911 P.2d 389, 390 (Wash. 1996).
223. See, e.g., In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838
P.2d 1 (Okla. 1992).
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described it, this standard would require that "[i]f the [federal]
statute's terms can be read sensibly not to have a pre-emptive effect,
224
the presumption controls and no pre-emption may be inferred."

Thus, in theory, application of the presumption protects states'
rights by encouraging an outcome that upholds state law.
Yet, in practice, the doctrine has had limited impact. While the
Court has often mentioned the presumption, the cases show no
consensus on a technique for applying it. 225 Courts have considered

the presumption inconsistently, sometimes invoking it when
addressing federal legislation impacting traditional state issues and
sometimes not. Even where the presumption has been used, courts
often have given it little specific content.2 6
1.

Interpretingthe Language of a Statute Narrowly or Broadly

Preemption analysis generally begins simply with a
"straightforward analysis of the statutory language.",22 However, in
applying the presumption when analyzing the direct language of a
statute, the Court, at times, has interpreted terms narrowly to allow

224. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 116-17 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
225. Even though the Supreme Court continues to recognize the
presumption against preemption, "not all Members of th[e] Court agree" on how
it should be applied and it often has little impact on preemption analysis.
Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S.Ct. 1756, 1763
(2004) ("The dissent objects to our interpretive method, which neither invokes
the 'presumption against pre-emption' to determine the scope of pre-emption
nor delves into legislative history. Application of those methods, on which not
all Members of this Court agree, demonstrably makes no difference to
resolution of the principal question.... ."). Some commentators have noted that
the cases the Court has decided since Medtronic in 1996 suggest a swing away
from the presumption against preemption and back to the pre-1930s formula of
automatic preemption, or as one author phrased it, "a presumption in favor of
preemption."

Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of

Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 968 (2002) (arguing that the presumption has
rarely prevented federal law from controlling); see also Susan Raeker-Jordon,
The Pre-emption Presumption That Never Was: Pre-emption Doctrine Swallows

the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379 (1998).
226. While, procedurally, a true presumption shifts the burden to an
opposing party, the presumption against preemption, when applied most
rigorously, is more comparable to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Just
as the Court first attempts to decide a case on statutory or common law grounds
before resorting to constitutional analysis, it, likewise, in the preemption
context will make significant efforts to read federal and state law in harmony to
avoid preemption.
227. New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 20 (2002);
See also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996) ("[Our analysis of the
scope of the pre-emption statute must begin with its text.").

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

a reading without a preemptive effect. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
illustrates this use of "a 'presumption against the pre-emption'. . to
support a narrow interpretation of... express" language in a federal
statute.22 The Medtronic plaintiff attempted to sue a pacemaker
manufacturer in state court under claims of negligence and strict
Section 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments
liability.
("MDA") prohibits states from establishing "any requirement"
different

from those

stated in the federal

act. 229

Defendant

Medtronic argued that use of the word "requirement" preempted any
230
state common law claims.
In a previous decision, the Supreme Court had determined that
the word "requirements" could preempt common law damages
claims. 23' Yet, a plurality of the Court (Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg) 232 applied a narrower construction of the word
"requirement" to conclude that state common law claims were not
preempted by the MDA. In doing so, the plurality noted that
"Medtronic's sweeping interpretation of the statute would require
remedies, producing a
far greater interference with state legal
233
serious intrusion into state sovereignty."

In contrast, the Court in Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v. South
2 34 refused to use this same
Coast Air Quality Management District
narrow reading of words approach to prevent preemption. The
majority examined rules created by a local California clean air
district that attempted to reduce pollution in the Los Angeles area
by restricting the purchase or lease of some fleet vehicles. 235 The
District Court and the Ninth Circuit found that the rules were not
"standards" under § 209(a) of the Clean Air Act 36 because they were
purchase restrictions, and the Act only preempted restrictions on
228. 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 518, 523 (1992)).
229. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000).
230. Medtronic, 518 U.S. 470 at 481.
231. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521-22 (finding, among other things, that the
word "requirement" in the federal cigarette labeling and advertising laws
expressly preempted some state common law claims).
232. These were the same four justices that formed the plurality in
Medtronic. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
233. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 488. In addition, the plurality noted that the
presumption against preemption applied not "only to the question whether
Congress intended any pre-emption at all" but also to "the scope of its intended
invalidation of state law." Id. at 485.
234. 124 S.Ct. 1756 (2004).
235. Id. at 1759.
236. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S.Coast Air Quality, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1117
(C.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 309 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 124 S.Ct. 1756
(2004).
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sales of vehicles.
The Supreme Court disagreed and interpreted "standard"
broadly, concluding the Clean Air Act was an express provision
requiring preemption of the local rules.237 In his dissent, Justice
Souter invoked the presumption against preemption to urge a
narrower interpretation of the word "standard" to eliminate conflict
231
and avoid preemption.
Search for Intent Through Extrinsic Sources
Similarly, the Court has been inconsistent in applying the
presumption in other circumstances. In some cases, the Court has
refused to search for congressional intent anywhere except through
reference to the specific words in a statute.239 In other cases, the
Court has been willing to refer to extrinsic information, such as the
examination of the statutory framework and the interpretation of
the absence of language in a federal statute to favor preservation of
state law. As Justice Stevens noted: "Although our analysis of the
scope of the pre-emption statute must begin with its text, our
interpretation.., does not occur in a contextual vacuum."24 °
As one of the earliest Supreme Court decisions on the
presumption against preemption, Mintz v. Baldwin241 exemplifies
the use of extrinsic information. The statute in Mintz contained
express language allowing shipping of cattle without state
24 2 The
inspection if those cattle had undergone federal inspections.
Mintz Court interpreted this language as evidence of Congress's
intent only to exclude state control in the narrow area addressed by
the statute.243 Thus, this exclusion was evidence that "Congress
to trammel the enforcement of state . . .
intended not
244 otherwise
measures."
245
Another example occurred in Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp.
In Silkwood, nuclear power operators argued that the Atomic
Energy Act ("AEA") preempted a worker's state law tort claims for
contamination at the plant. Even though the AEA had occupied the
2.

237. Engine Mfrs., 124 S. Ct. at 1764.
238. Id. at 1766-67 (Souter, J., dissenting).
239. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483,
484 (2001).
240. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 at 484-85 (citations omitted).
241. 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
242. Id. at 347 n.1.
243. Id. at 352.
244. Id. at 351. The federal statute at issue in this case states: "Whenever
any [federal] inspector.., shall issue a certificate... cattle... may be shipped
without further inspection... ." 21 U.S.C. §§ 120-21 (2000).
...
245. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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entire field of nuclear safety concerns, the Silkwood Court preserved
the worker's state tort claims. Pivotal to the Court's analysis was a
review of legislative history. The Court noted: "It is difficult to
believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means 2of4
judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct." 1
Furthermore, the Silkwood Court observed:
Indeed, there is no indication that Congress even seriously
considered precluding the use of [state tort claims] either when
it enacted the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 or when it amended
it in 1959. This silence takes on added significance in light of
Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons
247
injured by such conduct.
3. Structure and Purposeof a Statute
A third technique the Supreme Court has used to give weight to
the presumption against preemption is to focus on Congress's
purpose or objective in enacting a statute instead of concentrating
on specific words or provisions in an act.2 48 A court can interpret the
purpose or objective of the federal statute narrowly, or a court can
focus on alternative objectives for a state statute. Thus, by focusing
on the purpose of legislation, rather than on the text of the statute
alone, this approach addresses not "only ...

the question whether

Congress intended any pre-emption at all,"
but also limits "the scope
249
of its intended invalidation of state law."

Medtronic illustrates this approach. In Medtronic, the plurality
246. Id. at 251.
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996) ("Second,
our analysis of the scope of the statute's pre-emption is guided by our oftrepeated comment . . . that '[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone' in every pre-emption case." (citations omitted)); see also, Hoke,
supra note 99, at 852 n.107 ("The distinction between purpose and effect
continues to play a vibrant role in the Court's preemption jurisprudence.").
249. Medtronic, 518 U.S at 485. The Court further stated:
[Our] interpretation is informed by two presumptions about the
nature of pre-emption.
First, because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal
system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and
particularly in those in which Congress has "legislated... in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied," we "start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."
Id. (citations omitted).
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focused on legislative history to provide context for its conclusion
that the state common-law claims were not preempted. First, when
Congress enacted the MDA, it "was primarily concerned with the
problem of specific, conflicting state statutes and regulations rather
25 Second,
than the general duties enforced by common-law actions.""
the Medtronic Court concluded that silence in the legislative history
about the impact of the MDA on common-law claims indicated
Congress did not intend the legislation to be a "sweeping preemption of traditional common-law remedies. 25'
As an alternative to limiting the federal objective, the Court
reconciled federal and state enactments by looking to the objective of
the state measure in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Development Commission.25 2 Pacific Gas
addressed a California statute that made approval for the
construction of new nuclear power plants contingent on
demonstrating a long-term solution to disposal of nuclear waste. 53
The California legislature enacted the statute in response to
pressure from voters to pass an initiative that would impose a
moratorium on nuclear power plants.'54 The Supreme Court upheld
the state restrictions even though the California statute effectively
thwarted the AEA's goal of encouraging nuclear power.
The Pacific Gas Court avoided preemption by determining that
despite the contrary effects of the federal and state statutes, the
objectives were not in conflict. In addition to the language of the
federal statute, the Court considered congressional committee
reports and testimony to support its interpretation that the scope of
the AEA was limited to "protection against radiation hazards."2 5
The Court went on to conclude that "the Federal Government has
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns." 56 Thus, if the
state restrictions were "for safety reasons . . .[they] would be pre-

empted."2 57
With this broad interpretation of the scope of the AEA, the
Court could have concluded that the state statute was preempted
because it addressed nuclear safety and was drafted to address
250. Id. at 489.
251. Id. at 491.
252. 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983).
253. Id. at 198.
254. The California -nuclear law at issue in the case, California Public
Resources code § 25524, arose as a legislative response to Proposition 15, which
California voters proposed, but did not pass, in June of 1976. Id. at 215 n.27.
255. Id. at 210-11 (citing a report by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
and statements in the Congressional Record).
256. Id. at 212.
257. Id. at 213.
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radiation hazards with "safety purposes in mind."258 However, the
Pacific Gas Court focused instead on the state's "avowed economic
purpose as the rationale" for its statute. 259 To reach this result, the
Court looked beyond federal legislative or administrative sources
and instead turned to peripheral state materials. The state
statute's "avowed economic purpose" was not stated in the
California statute itself. Instead, the assertion of the state's
economic purpose was based upon a report issued by one of the
California Assembly's legislative committees. 26 0 Thus, even though
the state act effectively thwarted Congress's purpose, the Pacific
Gas Court used this extrinsic information
from the state to conclude
2 61
the state act was not preempted:
26 2
On the other hand, Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.

illustrates the opposite extreme. The Geier Court held that the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempted an injured
motorist's claim for defective design under District of Columbia tort
law.262 Writing for a majority of five, Justice Breyer concluded that
the federal statute's express preemption clause did not control.2
Furthermore, the federal statute contained a savings clause that
stated the federal standards do "not exempt any person from any
liability under common law.2 65 If the Court had applied the
presumption against preemption, these two express provisions in
the statute could be read broadly to allow plaintiffs state law claims
to coexist with the federal statute. Instead, the Court interpreted
the savings clause narrowly and applied "ordinary working of
conflict pre-emption principles" to imply that Congress intended to

258. Id. at 215.
259. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
260.

Id. at 213 (citing

CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON RESOURCES, LAND

USE, AND ENERGY, REASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA:
ANALYSIS

OF PROPOSITION

15 AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

A POLICY

(ASSESSMENT REPORT)

(1976)).
261. Id. at 213, 223. Pacific Gas also is a good illustration of the Court's
inconsistent application of the presumption against preemption. The analysis
involved two areas that states traditionally police: safety and the generation of
power. The Court's opinion, however, contains no mention of the presumption
against preemption. Despite this omission, the Pacific Gas Court rigorously
applied the presumption against preemption technique of interpreting federal
and state statutes to avoid conflict. Furthermore, by looking beyond the federal
act and resorting to extraneous state materials to avoid the conflict, Pacific Gas
represents one of the most extensive applications of the approach of reading
federal and state statutes harmoniously.
262. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
263. Id. at 865.
264. Id. at 867.
265. Id. at 869 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)).
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preempt the right to seek tort remedies recognized by the local
common law.266
Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg dissented from
the majority's conclusions in Geier, "especially from the Court's
unprecedented extension of the doctrine of pre-emption. 2' 67 In
addition to invoking "federalism," the dissenters noted "that the
Supremacy Clause does not give unelected federal judges carte
blanche to use federal law as a means of imposing their own ideas of
tort reform on the States."26

The Geier dissenters specifically

addressed the role of the presumption against preemption in
balancing the use of extrinsic information to go beyond the text of a
statute to determine Congressional purpose. The dissenters cited
the presumption as a necessary curb on judges to "reduce[ ] the risk
that federal judges will draw too deeply on . . . unaccountable

sources... in finding pre-emption."2 69
The Geier dissent also stated that certain situations warrant a
more rigorous application of the presumption against preemption.
For example, the dissenters noted that preemption by federal agency
raises "heightened federalism and nondelegation
actions

266. Id. at 869-70. Geier may represent a "seismic shift in the Court's
preemption doctrine," or it may manifest, instead, that "the Court's distrust of
products liability actions is greater than its interest in determining
congressional intent or preserving traditional state authority." Davis, supra
note 225, at 1009, 1012. Although the Court's decisions since Geier have all
upheld preemption, they involve either tort reform issues comparable to Geier
or issues clearly within the federal realm. See, e.g., Aetna Health, Inc. v.
Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (holding ERISA benefit scheme preempts
attempts to bring state tort claims); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525 (2001) (using federal cigarette labeling legislation to preempt state false
advertising claims); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)
(preempting a state's policy toward the country of Burma because the federal
government controls the area of foreign affairs).
267. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 908 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v.
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1767 (2004) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (urging a more rigorous application of the presumption against
preemption to allow "consideration of legislative purposes" to do "a better job of
honoring preemption principles consistently with congressional intent").
270. While recognizing that federal regulations could have the same
preemptive authority as federal statutes, the Hillsborough Court concluded
they should be reviewed differently. The Court reasoned that because agencies
regularly address problems with great detail, comprehensiveness was not
compelling evidence of an intent to preempt an entire field. "We are even more
reluctant to infer pre-emption from the comprehensiveness of regulations than
from the comprehensiveness of statutes." Hillsborough County v. Automated
Med. Labs.. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985). Furthermore, agency statements
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concerns"271 because agencies "are clearly not designed to represent
the interests of States."272
In summary, the presumption against preemption can impact a
court's analysis in both express and implied preemption contexts.
Because any statutory language is potentially ambiguous, even with
express language, the scope of Congress' intent to preempt is rarely
clear.273 Consequently, courts often have "tremendous discretion" in
making determinations about conflict.274 In its most rigorous form,
the presumption against preemption allows courts to use a number
of techniques, from a narrow interpretation of statutory words to an
examination of extrinsic sources, to support a reading of the federal
and state statutes that allows them to coexist.

asserting an intent to preempt often undergo a more rigorous two-step inquiry
to determine the agency's authority. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486
U.S. 57 (1988). Members of the Court may disagree about what statements are
specific enough, but they do agree that agency statements must be sufficiently
clear in their preemptive intent to warrant deference. See, e.g., New York v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 20, 23 (2002) (concluding that a
federal agency appropriately applied its authority over a traditionally stateregulated utilities issue, based on a "straightforward analysis of the statutory
language" as well as on legislative history). The concurring and dissenting
opinion concluded, however, that deference was not appropriate due to
inconsistencies in the agency's positions and lack of a clearly articulated
preemptive intent. Id. at 30, 37-38 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Thomas also cited United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 228 (2001), for the proposition that deference should vary depending on the
agency's care and consistency. New York v. Fed. Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S.
at 38 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
271. Geier, 529 U.S. at 908 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also
remarked:
Because of the role of States as separate sovereigns in our federal
system, we have long presumed that state laws-particularly those,
such as the provision of tort remedies to compensate for personal
injuries, that are within the scope of the States' historic police
powers-are not to be pre-empted by a federal statute unless it is the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do so.
Id. at 894 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Gade v. Nat'l
Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
272. Geier, 529 U.S. at 908 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
273. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CoNsTITuTIONAL LAW 381 (2d ed. 2002).
274. Id. at 384. Gardbaum has argued that all preemption can be
categorized simply as "conflict cases." Gardbaum, supra note 182, at 775-76.
As support for this characterization, Gardbaum cites Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor as saying: "Field preemption may be understood as a species of
conflict preemption: A state law that falls within a preempted field conflicts
with Congress's intent (either expressly or plainly implied) to exclude state
regulation." Gardbaum, supra note 182, at 776 (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 104
n.2 (citations omitted)).
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PreemptionStandard for Ballot Initiatives

Although courts have applied the presumption against
preemption erratically, they should apply it in its most rigorous
form for ballot initiatives that address social experimentation in
health and safety. These initiatives should be entitled to a rigorous
presumption against preemption for at least two reasons. First,
they involve topics traditionally reserved to the states. Second, they
commonly involve areas of social experimentation that cannot
survive the legislative process.
Absent some type of rigorous
presumption, efforts at this type of social experimentation will be
greatly slowed, if not stopped.
As a general rule, state courts reviewing ballot initiatives have
given them greater deference.
These courts have construed
2 75
initiatives liberally to facilitate the expressed will of the people
and to promote citizens' rights and the democratic process.27 When
interpreting ballot initiatives, many state courts follow a standard
requiring that all "doubts . . . be resolved in favor of [upholding an
initiative measure]. " 277 This standard is comparable to the rigorous

presumption against preemption standard articulated by Justice
Souter, requiring any sensible reading of the federal statute to
promote no preemptive effect.278
Federal courts also have given ballot initiatives special
recognition. For example, the Supreme Court noted that direct
votes require distinct treatment and are especially helpful for
"single-shot" situations that "put one discrete issue to the voters."279
275. See, e.g., Legislature of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 40 (Cal. 1983)
(Richardson, J., dissenting); see also Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122
F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1997).
276. See, for example, the following cases which have liberally construed
initiatives to facilitate citizens' rights and promote the democratic process:
Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1995); Wagner v. Secretary of State, 663 A.2d
564 (Me. 1995); and State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft, 591 N.E.2d 1186 (Ohio 1992).
277. Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1976) (quoting Mervynne v. Acker, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 340, 344 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Gayle v. Hamm, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628,
634 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)). The Gayle Court also stated that its policy was to
"apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order
that the right be not improperly annulled." Id. Furthermore, the courts are to
.resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of [the initiative power's] exercise."
Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Cal. 1991) (citations omitted).
278. Gade, 505 U.S. at 116-17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
279. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at the Local Level, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259, 266 (1977). In concluding that the equal protection principles
applicable in gauging the fairness of an election had only limited relevance in
analyzing the "single-shot" referendum process, the Court stated:
In a referendum, the expression of voter will is direct, and there is no
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In 1998, members of Congress sought special recognition for
initiative-created laws by proposing legislation that would limit the
power of federal judges to invalidate them. 210
The Supreme Court addressed ballot-initiative preemption in
Gregory v. Ashcroft ,2 1 the first case to turn a fifty-year tide of
Supreme Court precedents favoring federal dominance over states'
rights. 82 Gregory involved a mandatory retirement provision for
need to assure that the voters' views will be adequately represented
through their representatives in the legislature. The policy impact of
a referendum is also different in kind from the impact of choosing
representatives-instead of sending legislators off to the state capitol
to vote on a multitude of issues, the referendum puts one discrete
issue to the voters.
Id.

280. H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998). The bill passed the House of
Representatives on April 23, 1998. 144 CONG. REC. D397 (daily ed. Apr. 23,
1998). The "Judicial Reform Act of 1998" no longer permitted a single judge to
invalidate an initiative, but instead would require three-judge panels for such
decisions. Id. at H2244. Although this legislation never garnered majority
support in the Senate, it represented opposition by some members of Congress
to the "elitist" attitude that "the people do not know what is best for them and
therefore need someone else to tell them." Donald S. Greenberg, Comment, The
Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California,54 CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1747
(1966). The "Judicial Reform Act" was proposed after a federal district court
judge in California barred enforcement of Proposition 209, a ballot initiative
that prohibited affirmative action in California. 144 CONG. REC. S6181, S6187
(daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Although the district court
judge held that it was likely that Proposition 209 was preempted by Title VII,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plain language of Title VII did not preempt
Proposition 209. Coalition For Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1517,
(N.D. Cal. 1996) vacated, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997). The district court and
circuit court opinions are reprinted in Coalition For Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122
F.3d 692, 710 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit avoided preemption without
applying a heightened presumption, yet the heightened presumption standard
might not apply in this situation because Proposition 209 does not satisfy all
three of the criteria set out above to support use of this heightened
presumption. See supra Part II.B.3. It might be argued that Proposition 209
addressed social experimentation, but affirmative action is not a topic area of
traditional local concern comparable to health and safety.
281. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
282. In Gregory, the Court, for the first time since 1936, recognized the
Tenth Amendment as an independent limit on the power of the federal
government. See, for example, CHEMERINSKY, supra note 273, at 310-11, which
states:
Between 1937 and the 1990s, there was only one case where a federal
law was declared unconstitutional as violating the Tenth Amendment
and that decision was later expressly overruled. During this era, the
Court expressly rejected the view that the Tenth Amendment is an
independent limit on the legislative power and instead viewed it
simply as a reminder that Congress may legislate only if there is
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state court judges, which voters added to the Missouri Constitution
Some of the affected state court judges
by ballot initiative.
challenged the provision as a violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 283 arguing the provision should
be preempted by the ADEA's prohibition against discharging any
individual "because of such individual's age."28 4 The Court concluded
that the initiative-created retirement provisions were not preempted
by the ADEA. In reaching this conclusion, the Gregory Court noted:
"Congressional interference with this decision of the people of
Missouri... would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal
and state powers. For this reason, 'it is incumbent upon the federal
courts to be certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal
law overrides' this balance." 285
The Gregory Court refused to read the ADEA as covering state
judges because the statute did not make it "clear that judges are
included.28 6 The dissenting and concurring opinion complained
about this heightened requirement for congressional specificity,8 7
authority in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court's characterization, just one year later, of the Tenth
Amendment as a "truism" or "essentially a tautology," may undercut some of
Gregory's impact as a "resurrection" of the Tenth Amendment. New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 273, at
314-15 ("The first indication of this resurrection [of the Tenth Amendment]
occurred in Gregory v. Ashcroft in 1991.").
283. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
284. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 456-57 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 613(a), 623(a) (1988)).
285. Id. at 460 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
243 (1985)). Although the Court cites to the Atascadero case as authority for
these statements, it goes on to say that "Atascadero was an Eleventh
Amendment case, but a similar approach is applied in other contexts. Congress
should make its intention 'clear and manifest' if it intends to pre-empt the
historic powers of the States." Id. at 461 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't. of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (articulating for the first time the presumption against
preemption for topic areas that states traditionally regulate))). The Gregory
Court also stated: "[I]f Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional
balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its
intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.'" Id. at
461 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 65, and Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242). The Court
further indicated: "In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting
the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the
legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical
matters involved in the judicial decision." Id. (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 65, and
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
286. Id. at 467.
287. The dissenting and concurring opinion objected that the Court "never
extended the plain statement approach that far" in the past. Id. at 476 (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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but the majority noted that requiring specificity prevented
preemption of the state initiative, and, thus, could be useful to
"avoid a potential constitutional problem."
28 9
Although the Gregory Court invoked a "plain statement rule"
requiring Congress to expressly and explicitly preempt state law,
the heightened presumption against preemption involves a more
comprehensive approach that better addresses federalism concerns.
A heightened presumption against preemption would preserve the
role of the courts as arbiters of the delicate balance between
Congress and the people of the states. It narrows the reach of
federal preemption and recognizes federalism as a source of
restraint. 290 Without such restraint, the "United States, alone
among western federal systems, [may have] moved to the permissive
end of the spectrum where there is no constitutional protection of
state lawmaking capacity."2 9' Avoiding such a result is compelled
not only by federalism concerns, but by a deeper need to protect the
democratic process. Justice Frankfurter addressed this relationship
in 1959 when he noted that in deciding preemption cases, courts had
to give "due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal
system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter
of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy."292
To make this deference meaningful, the standard used when
288. Id. at 464. Although other portions of the Gregory opinion address the
Eleventh Amendment and the federal government's ability to allow suits
against states, the Court makes this "potential constitutional problem"
reference in the same paragraph in which it raises concerns about "limits that
the state-federal balance places on Congress' powers under the Commerce
Clause." Id. The Court applied the plain statement rule to avoid a
constitutional conflict, balancing federal and state interests in the preemption
context, even though Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 469

U.S. 528 (1985), had restricted the Court's ability to conduct a similar balancing
test in the context of the Commerce Clause. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464.
289. Id. ("[To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere
congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on
which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." (quoting LAWRENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988))).
290. Despite the current Court's declarations supporting federalism, it has
not yet used preemption doctrine to narrow the reach of federal power. See, e.g.,
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363 (2000) (all cases in which the Court finds federal law to preempt state
law).
291. Gardbaum, supra note 182, at 813.
292. S.D. Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959). Despite
Frankfurter's caution, the Garmon Court found that state tort damages could
be preempted if picketing by the defendant unions was protected under the
National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 246.
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analyzing such measures should at least represent the highest
standard used for traditional presumption against preemption
analysis. Because rigorous application of the presumption dictates
that courts should adopt any sensible interpretation of the federal
29 3
enactment that will avoid preempting such state ballot initiatives,
a court may not stop with the text of a federal statute alone to find
conflict. Instead, it must also look beyond the words, using the
structure of the statute and extrinsic aids, such as legislative history
or the lack of it, to discern congressional purpose. In adopting such
an interpretation, courts examining ballot initiatives would not be
able to avoid examination of the extrinsic sources. Even if the
language of the statute seemed clear, courts would have an
obligation to look beyond the text to determine whether
congressional intent would allow for an interpretation that avoided
conflict and invalidation of the ballot initiative.
III. PREEMPTION CASE STUDY OF A MEDICAL MARIJUANA INITIATIVE

The California Compassionate Use Act of 1996, or Proposition
215, 294 is useful to illustrate the potential impact of applying a rule
of greater deference to ballot initiatives involving experimentation
in the area of health and safety. In general, Proposition 215 sought
to legalize the use of marijuana if prescribed for medical reasons.
The initiative, therefore, authorizes marijuana possession by
prescription.295
296
In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative,
the Supreme Court concluded Proposition 215 was preempted by
federal law, at least when applied to the manufacture and
distribution of marijuana. 29'

The Court did not address, however,

whether federal law preempts Proposition 215 when applied to the
possession of medical marijuana. Although the initiative addressed
health, a matter of important local concern, the Court made no effort
to determine whether a sensible interpretation existed to avoid
Instead, the majority limited its
preempting Proposition 215.

293. See, for example, Justice Souter's characterization of the standard in
Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Association, 505 U.S. 88, 116-17
(1992) (Souter, J., dissenting). See also supra note 224 and accompanying text.
294. See Cal. Proposition 215 (1996) (codified as The California
Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5
http://vote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/html/
available
at
(Deering
2000)),
BP/215text.htm.
295. Proposition 215 also allowed citizens to grow and distribute medical
marijuana if they registered with the state. Id.
296. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
297. Id. at 494.
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analysis to the text of the federal statute alone.298 In so doing, the
Court made no effort to use extrinsic materials to determine
whether the two laws could in fact be reconciled.
Perhaps a more rigorous application of the presumption against
preemption may not have altered the outcome in the Oakland
Cannabis case because that case involved the manufacture and
distribution of medical marijuana. However, applying the more
rigorous standard may be outcome determinative when the Court
addresses the preemption issue in the context of possession by
individual users of medical marijuana.
A.

2

99

Background of the Regulation of Medical Marijuana

1. History
Marijuana,"' also know as cannabis' or hemp, has been used
for medicinal purposes for more than 6,000 years.0 3 People in China
and India first recognized the antiseptic and analgesic value of
marijuana, and other medical uses soon developed. 30 Around the
fifth century B.C., travelers and traders spread knowledge of
marijuana's properties westward to Persia and Arabia. Physicians

298. Id. at 491-92.
299. Marijuana has a long history as an intoxicant. Arabic writers in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries noted the social use of marijuana and
unsuccessful government attempts to control it.

ALAN BOCK, WAITING TO

175 (2000). When the Ottomans
conquered Egypt in the fourteenth century A.D., they tried to outlaw marijuana
because Egyptian hemp growers were leading tax revolts. In addition, "[tlhe
Turks complained that cannabis use caused Egyptians to laugh and be
INHALE: THE POLITICS OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA

disrespectful of their Sultan and his representatives."
EMPEROR WEARS No CLOTHES 74 (11th ed. 1998).

JACK HERER, THE

300. Marijuana or marihuana is the Mexican term for the drug. The use of
this term did not become prevalent in the United States until fear of cheap
Mexican farm labor resulted in the drug's criminalization. Kathleen Auerhahn,
The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug Legislation in the United
States, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 411, 418 (1999).
301. Cannabis was the commonly used term for the drug until the twentieth
century. Other common names are "pot," "dope," and "weed." Some argue that
the Marihuana Tax Act passed in 1937 because some of the legislators did not
even realize that marijuana and cannabis were the same. DAVID R. FORD,
MARIJUANA: NOT GUILTY AS CHARGED 62, 64 (1997).

302. "Hemp, cannabis hemp, Indian (India) hemp, true hemp, muggles, pot,
marijuana, reefer, grass, ganja, bhang, 'the kind,' dagga, herb, etc. all refer to
exactly the same plant." HERER, supra note, 299, at 1.
303. Hemp originated in Central Asia and has been cultivated in China
since 4000 B.C. Tiersky, supra note 23, at 548 (1999).
304. BOCK, supra note 299, at 175.
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in the classical and Hellenistic eras listed marijuana as a remedy, °5
in Europe
and it became "used both industrially and 30medicinally"
6
during the Middle Ages, despite a papal ban.
The first record of marijuana in the colonial United States dates
back to 1611 when Jamestown settlers brought the plant to Virginia
for use in hemp production. 7 Many used marijuana as legal tender
in the Americas from 1631 until the early 1800S,308 and until the late

1930s it reigned as one of the country's top cash crops. 9 In addition
to industrial hemp, medicinal marijuana was widely dispensed by
physicians and pharmacists to treat a variety of illnesses.310 At the
time the Bill of Rights was ratified, no laws restricted marijuana or
its ingestion.31' Marijuana's popularity as a medication burgeoned
when Europeans rediscovered it in 1839,' 31 and it became the second
or third most prescribed medicine in the United States from 1842
until the 1890s.313
Marijuana began to lose favor as a medication in the early part
305. Declaration of Lester Grinspoon, M.D., In Support of Defendants'
Response to Show Cause Order at 123a, United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-151), available at 2001 WL
34093965.
306. HERER, supra note 299, at 74.
307. Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., State Medical Marijuana Laws:
Understandingthe Laws and their Limitations, 23(4) J. PUB. HEALTH POLY, 413,

413-439 (2003). Marijuana's history as a fabric goes farther back than its
medicinal roots. "The earliest known woven fabric was apparently of hemp,
which began to be worked in the eighth millennium (8,000-7,000 B.C.)." THE
COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 54 (John A. Garraty & Peter Gay eds., 1972),
cited in HERER, supra note 299, at 2.
308. HERER, supra note 299, at 1.
309. David Solomon, Editor's Forwardto THE MARIJUANA PAPERS xiv (David

Solomon ed., 1966).
310. Pacula, supra note 307, at 415. See also Brief for the Respondents at
43, Oakland Cannabis(No. 00-151), available at 2001 WL 173541.

311. Brief for the Respondents at 43, Oakland Cannabis (No. 00-151), 532
U.S. at 483, availableat 2001 WL 173541.
312. In that year, a British doctor, O'Shaugnessy, serving in India's Bengal
province published a forty-page paper on marijuana's medical use. Around this
time, French doctors Aubert-Rouche and Moreau de Tours also published their
discoveries about the Middle Eastern use of marijuana as a medicine. See BOCK,
supra note 299, at 176.
During this time, more than 100
313. HERER, supra note 299, at 2.
published articles in the United States recommended marijuana to treat one
disorder or another. BOCK, supra note 299, at 176; see also Tod Mikuriya,
Therapeutic Potential and Medical Uses of Marijuana, 14 J. PSYCHOACTVE

239 (1982). In 1860, the Ohio State Medical Society's Committee on
Cannabis Indica reported marijuana's success in treating stomach pain,
childbirth psychosis, chronic cough, tetanus, bronchitis, inflammatory and
neuralgic pain, epileptic seizures, and gonorrhea. BOCK, supra note 299, at 176.
DRUGS
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of the twentieth century. 314 At this time, the federal and state
governments began to criminalize the use of certain drugs,
frequently for blatantly racist reasons.315 California and Utah
passed state laws outlawing marijuana in 1915,316 and Colorado
followed suit in 1917.317
314. Opiates, which are water soluble, are more easily injected with a
hypodermic syringe, which was introduced in 1856. Since cannabis is not water
soluble, its use as a medicine declined during this time. BOCK, supra note 299,
at 177. A number of leading pharmaceutical companies, such as Parke Davis,
Squibb, Lilly, and Burroughs Wellcome, sold cannabis preparations widely in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. BOCK, supra note 299, at
177.
315. Auerhahn, supra note 300, at 417. The first federal regulation of drugs,
the Harrison Act of 1914, addressed the importation of opium for medicinal
purposes and the interstate trade of cocaine, morphine, and heroin; it did not
mention marijuana. Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914),
amended by ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1130-33 (1919) (repealed 1939).
Governments began to criminalize drug use partially because of ethnic
antagonism. Auerhahn, supra note 300, at 417. For example, the antidrug
movement in the early part of the twentieth century displayed a pattern of
criminalization of the drug behavior of minority groups that posed a threat to
more powerful and higher-paid labor groups. The incarceration of large
numbers of minority laborers reduced their availability in the job market. Antiopium statutes originated in the West at the peak of Chinese immigrations.
The campaign against cocaine originated in the South when the introduction of
free blacks to the postbellum labor market threatened to undercut wages. In
the North, an influx of European immigrants spurred the temperance
movement. Because marijuana was associated with Mexican-Americans labors,
restrictions on its use arose in the Southwestern states with larger MexicanAmerican populations. Auerhahn, supra note 300, at 432. Another reason for
criminalizing the habits of certain ethnic groups was the perceived link between
drugs and violent crime. "Police officials in cities of those states where it is
most widely used estimate that fifty per cent [sic] of the violent crimes
committed in districts occupied by Mexicans, Spaniards, Latin-Americans,
Greeks, or Negroes may be traced to this evil." RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES
H.

WHITEBREAD,

II,

THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION:

A

HISTORY OF MARIHUANA

PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 100 (1974).

316. HERER, supra note 299, at 90; see 1915 Cal. Stat. 1066; 1915 Utah
Laws 77.
317. HERER, supra note 299, at 90. From about 1914 to 1931, twenty-nine
states, including seventeen west of the Mississippi, passed laws that prohibited
the use of marijuana for nonmedicinal purposes, and by 1933, nearly every
western state had passed anti-marijuana legislation. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD,
supra note 315, at 51. Many of the legislative proceedings contained explicit
references to the drug's Mexican origins. Id. at 39. Marijuana prohibitions
enacted 1915-1931 before the passage of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act
included: 1932 Ala. Acts 42; 1931 Ariz. Sess. Laws 61; 1923 Ark. Acts 177; 1915
Cal. Stat. 1066; 1917 Colo. Sess. Laws 120; 1927 Idaho Sess. Laws 136; 1931 Ill.
Laws 1027; 1929 Ind. Acts 616; 1921 Iowa Acts 306; 1927 Kan. Sess. Laws 247;
1914 La. Acts 71; 1914 Me. Laws 300; 1914 Mass. Acts 704; 1929 Mich. Pub.

2005]

INITIATIVES IN THE PREEMPTIONEQUATION

277

2. Federal Regulation
The first federal attempt to legislate marijuana use occurred in
1937 with the Marijuana Tax Act.3 18 This 1937 statute did not
criminalize marijuana, but attempted to curb its use through a
prohibitive tax.3" 9 The Act imposed transfer and excise taxes on
marijuana growers, distributors, sellers, and buyers.32 ° At this time,
however, no evidence linked the medicinal use of cannabis to
addiction.3 2'
Marijuana had been listed in the United States
Pharmacopoeia since 1850,322 and American doctors continued to
prescribe it until 1937 when the paperwork and expense of
complying with the Marijuana Tax Act made it prohibitive."' By
Acts 841; 1930 Miss. Laws 13; 1927 Mont. Laws 324; 1927 Neb. Laws 393; 1923
Nevada Stat. 39; 1923 N.M. Laws 58; 1927 N.Y. Laws 1675; 1927 Ohio Laws
187; 1923 Ore. Laws 35; 1918 R.I. Pub. Laws 145; 1931 S.D. Laws 100; 1919
Tex. Gen. Laws 156; 1915 Utah Laws 77; 1915 Vt. Acts & Resolves 336; 1929
Wyo. Sess. Laws 67. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 315, at 354. The four
states to prohibit between 1931 and 1933 were: 1933 Del. Laws 658; 1933 N.D.
Laws 158; 1933 Okla. Sess. Laws 53; 1933 Pa. Laws 904. BONNIE &
WHITEBREAD,

supra note 315, at 354; see also Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H.

Whitebread, II, The ForbiddenFruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into
the Legal History of American MarijuanaProhibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971, 101020 (1970).
318. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937)
(superseded by Internal Revenue Code of 1939). The Act's introduction states:
"To impose an occupational excise tax upon certain dealers in marihuana, to
impose a transfer tax upon certain dealings in marihuana, and to safeguard the
revenue therefrom by registry and recording." Id.
319. THE MARIJUANA PAPERS 23 (David Solomon ed., New American Library
1966); see also BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 315, at 126.
320. See supra note 318.
321. See Letter from Dr. William C. Woodward, Legislative Counsel,
American Medical Association, to Hon. Pat Harrison, Chairman, United States
Senate Finance Committee (July 10, 1937), availableat http://www.druglibrary.
org/schaffer/hemp/taxact/t8.htm. The letter stated:
The American Medical Association has no objection to any reasonable
regulation of the medicinal use of cannabis and its preparations and
derivatives. It does protest, however, against being called upon to pay
a special tax, to use special order forms in order to procure the drug,
to keep special records concerning its professional use and to make
special returns to the Treasury Department officials, as a condition
precedent to the use of cannabis in the practice of medicine ... in the
several states, all separate and apart from the taxes, order forms,
records, and reports required under the Harrison Narcotics Act with
reference to opium and coca leaves and their preparations and
derivatives.
Id.
322. Id. at 176. A 1937 authority still listed twenty-eight pharmaceuticals
that contained cannabis. Id. at 177.
323. Id. at 177-78.
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1941, the National Formulary and Pharmacopoeia dropped
marijuana from their listings. 324
Although federal legislation in the 1950s increased the penalties
for violations of the Marijuana Tax Act, marijuana use was not
criminalized until 1970.25
That year, Congress passed the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, now called
the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA").326 The CSA replaced more
than fifty pieces of drug legislation.327 Title II of the 1970 Act
established five schedules to classify controlled substances according
to their potential for abuse.328 Schedule I, the most restrictive
category, includes "substances with no currently accepted medical
use, high abuse potential, and a lack of demonstrated safety under
medical supervision."329
324. Pacula notes:
After passage of the Act, prescriptions of marijuana declined because
doctors generally decided it was easier not to prescribe marijuana
than to deal with the extra work imposed by the new law. The
dramatic reduction in doctors' willingness to prescribe marijuana for
medicinal purposes is perhaps best exemplified by the removal of
cannabis from standard pharmaceutical reference texts (including the
United States Pharmacopoeia) by 1942.
Pacula, supra note 307, at 415-16. See also BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note
315, at 1062; RICHARD ISRALOWITZ, DRUG USE, POLICY, AND MANAGEMENT 134
(2d. ed. 2002).
325. In 1951, Congress passed the Bogg's Act, Pub. L. No. 255, 65 Stat. 767
(1951), which attempted to curb the spread of addiction with uniform and harsh
penalties for violations of the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act and the
Marijuana Tax Act. In 1956, Congress passed the Narcotic Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 728, 70 Stat. 567 (1956), further escalating drug penalties for a number of
drugs. The Bogg's Act was later repealed under the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1247
(1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000)).
326. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000).
327. GREENBERG, supra note 23, at 190. As Greenberg states:
America's "drug war" has primarily focused upon opium-based
substances since 1914 when the Harrison Act was adopted. For more
than 50 years, this federal statute was the main basis of narcotics
regulation in the U.S. as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The laws
and various amendments related to the Harrison Act were
consolidated in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970. This legislation reflected a fundamental change
in interpretation of the [Clommerce [Clause of the Constitution, "thus
eliminating the need to portray a police function as a revenue
measure."
Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
328. GREENBERG, supra note 23, at 6, 190-91. See also Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. at 1247-52.
329. Annaliese Smith, Comment, Marijuana as a Schedule I Substance:
Political Ploy or Accepted Science?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1137, 1137 (2000);
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In enacting the CSA, Congress debated whether marijuana
should even be included in Schedule I. The legislative history for
the CSA notes that marijuana is not narcotic, not addictive, and
does not cause violence or crime."O Marijuana was retained in
Schedule I only because the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Health and
"at least until the
Scientific Affairs recommended this classification
3 31
completion of certain studies now underway."

The CSA was enacted to address drug abuse and drug
trafficking.332
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Act addressed
possession primarily in the context of drug trafficking. Section
841(a)(1) made it a felony to "manufacture, distribute, or dispense,
or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance." 33 3 Simple possession was a misdemeanor, and
only violated the CSA if the possession was without "a valid
prescription or order, from a practitioner, while acting in the course
of his professional practice.3 34 In 1988, Congress added a new
section to the CSA addressing possession in "a personal use
amount." 335 Critics argued that the section "contains numerous
ambiguities, inconsistencies, and internal contradictions that will
make it virtually impossible to implement. 3

see also Pacula, supranote 307, at 416.
330. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,
4577-78.
331. Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4579. The CSA lists marijuana
in Schedule I as Tetrahydrocannabinols. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2000), Schedule
I(c)(17).
332. 21 U.S.C. § 801(2), (3) (outlining Congress's concerns). These concerns
primarily focus on two issues: (1) the "substantial and detrimental effect on the
health and general welfare of the American people" from "improper use;" and
(2) the interstate and international trafficking of illegal drugs. Id. In addition,
the House committee report on the bill states as the "Principal Purpose of the
Bill": "This legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the
growing menace of drug abuse in the United States .

. . ."

H.R. REP. No. 91-

1444. Finally, the committee report notes that the general philosophy of the
Commission was that "[t]he illegal traffic in drugs should be attacked with the
full power of the Federal Government" and that "[tihe individual abuser should
be rehabilitated." Id., reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4575.
333. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (emphasis added).
334. Id. § 844(a) ("It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless such substance was
obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order, from a
practitioner, while acting in the course of his professional practice .... ").
335. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4384
(1988).
336. Jonathan J. Rusch, "Consistency Is All I Ask": An Exegesis of Section
6486 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 415,

416 (1989).

None of the committee hearings or reports address the hastily
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Initiative Response to CongressionalInaction

The CSA itself provided room for reclassification of marijuana
under the Act. Section 601 authorized the President to establish a
Commission on Marijuana
and Drug Abuse to make
recommendations whether to reschedule marijuana or maintain it
as a Schedule I drug.137 In 1972, the Commission issued its report
recommending that Congress retain prohibitions against cultivation
and sale of marijuana, but eliminate state and federal criminal
penalties for marijuana possession and use. 8 The Commission also
reported "tremendous promise for therapeutic uses of natural
cannabis."339
Congress never implemented the Commission's
recommendations.3 4 °
added section, which created civil penalties for possession of Schedule I drugs.
When the section was introduced in Congress, some members argued that it
might be used punitively to make "drug users accountable for their actions,"
while others objected that it "advocated decriminalization of possession of small
quantities of drugs." Id. at 421-22.
337. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, § 601, 84 Stat. 1247 (1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801971 (2000 & Supp. 2004)). Richard Nixon convened the National Commission
on Marihuana and Drug Abuse in 1970 and appointed former Republican
governor of Pennsylvania, Raymond Shafer, as chair.
338.

U.S.

SIGNAL

OF

NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA:
MISUNDERSTANDING

152 (1972)

[hereinafter

NAT'L COMM'N

A
ON

The commission found no convincing evidence that marijuana use
caused crime, insanity, or aggressive behavior.
Id. at 75, 107. Nor did
evidence support that marijuana use per se served as a stepping-stone to other
drugs. Id. at 88-89. Further, the Commission stated:
The Commission recommends only the following changes in federal
law:
" POSSESSION OF MARIHUANA FOR PERSONAL USE
WOULD NO LONGER BE AN OFFENSE, BUT MARHUANA
POSSESSED IN PUBLIC WOULD REMAIN CONTRABAND
SUBJECT TO SUMMARY SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE.
MARIHUANA].

" CASUAL DISTRIBUTION OF SMALL AMOUNTS OF
MARIHUANA FOR NO RENUMERATION, OR
INSIGNIFICANT RENUMERATION NOT INVOLVING
PROFIT WOULD NO LONGER BE AN OFFENSE.
The Commission made these same recommendations to amend state
laws. Id. at 153-54.
339. Id. at 176.
340. In 1974, Senator James Eastland organized Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings designed to attack the work of the Shafer Commission.
ISRALOWITZ, supranote 324, at-135. Isralowitz stated:
Any researcher who had conducted a study showing that marijuana
was not harmful was not invited to deliver testimony. [And Eastland
stated] "we make no apology . . . for the one-sided nature of our
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In 1995, both the American Medical Association 341 and the
American
Health Association 34 endorsed the medical use of
•• Public
343
marijuana.
At least two government reports since 1995 also have
recognized a potential therapeutic value for marijuana.344
In

hearings-they were deliberately planned that way." The claims,
most of which were not able to stand up to retest validation, concluded
that marijuana caused brain damage, massive damage to the entire
cellular process including chromosomal abnormalities, adverse effects
on the reproductive process causing sterility and impotence, cancer,
and a life of lethargy called the "amotivational syndrome."
ISRALOWITZ, supra note 324, at 135 (citations omitted).
Advocates have attempted to use the administrative process to remove
marijuana from Schedule I. In 1972, a group submitted a petition to the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (now the Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA")) to reschedule marijuana as a Schedule II drug, which
would legalize physician prescription. Pacula, supra note 307, at 416. Not until
December 30, 1989 (following a series of court battles over the petition), did
DEA director John Lawn order that cannabis remain listed as a Schedule I
narcotic with no known medical use. Pacula, supra note 307, at 416. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit finally rendered a decision on February
18, 1994, upholding the DEA's decision to retain marijuana's Schedule I status.
Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The
D.C. Circuit upheld the DEA's decision even though a federal administrative
law judge supported rescheduling. Id. at 1133. See also Pacula, supra note 307,
at 416.
341. See 141 CONG. REc. E1374-01 (daily ed. June 30, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Solomon) (referencing an article in the Journal of the American Medical
Association, advocating the use of marijuana for medical purposes).
342. See 141 CONG. REC. E2365 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Frank) (referencing a resolution passed by The American Public Health
Association supporting the medical use of marijuana); see also 143 CONG. REC.
E194 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1997) (referencing an article by Jerome P. Kassirer,
M.D. from the New England Journal of Medicine, entitled Federal Foolishness
and Marijuana).
343. See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MARIJUANA: EARLY
EXPERIENCES WITH FOUR STATES' LAws THAT ALLOW USE FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES,
REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN,

SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND

HUMAN RESOURCES, HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,at 7 nn.13, 14 (Nov.
2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (citing AM.MED. ASS'N, COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC

AFFAIRS

REP.: Medical Marijuana (June 2001) [hereinafter AMA

REPORT]

and

NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING

SCIENCE BASE (Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309071550/html [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
THE

REPORT]). But see Medical MarijuanaReferenda Movement in America: Hearing

before the Subcomm. on Crime, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R. REP. No. 105-451 (1998).
344. AMA REPORT, supra note 343; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra
note 343. The Institute of Medicine Report is also cited in Conant v. Walters,
309 F.3d 629, 641 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring). In his concurrence,
Kozinski also cites to conclusions reached by governmental authorities in
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addition to the scientific support for rescheduling marijuana for
medicinal reasons, polls show that popular opinion also supports a
change. These polls show that between 60% and 80% of Americans
support medical use of marijuana.
Despite scientific backing and public support for medical
marijuana, the CSA has not been amended to reflect any shift in
consensus. 346 Debates on the issue have been so emotional and

Britain and Canada reaching the same conclusion, as well as a similar
determination in 1988 by an Administrative Law Judge for the Drug
Enforcement Administration. Conant, 309 F.3d at 641-42.
345. See supra note 175 and accompanying text; see also Steve Fox, Protect
Medical Marijuana Users, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 30, 2004, at 7E (citing an
October 2002 Time/CNN poll).
346. In 1998, Congress passed a joint resolution addressing medical
marijuana.
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Division F-Not Legalizing Marijuana for Medicinal Use,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-760 (1998). After ten preliminary
paragraphs addressing drug trafficking and drug abuse statistics, the resolution
states: "Congress continues to support the existing Federal legal process for
determining the safety and efficacy of drugs and opposes efforts to circumvent
this process by legalizing marijuana, and other Schedule I drugs, for medicinal
use without valid scientific evidence and the approval of the Food and Drug
Administration." Id., 112 Stat. at 2681-761, para. 11. When government
attorneys in the Oakland Cannabis case urged that this resolution could be
used as evidence of congressional intent in interpreting the CSA with respect to
medical marijuana, the Supreme Court declined to consider it. United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 493 n.6 (2001). Although the
Oakland CannabisCourt did not elaborate, there are at least three reasons why
the resolution did not clearly suggest that Congress intended to preempt state
medical marijuana initiatives through the CSA.
First, the joint resolution arose as an appropriations issue and was
passed as part of a compromise for a budget bill. Although the resolution
guaranteed that no federal money was appropriated to support programs urged
by Proposition 215, the current appropriations debates in Congress relate to
restricting Department of Justice funds used to enforce drug laws against
medical marijuana users. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. H5294-95 (daily ed. July 7,
2004) (statement of Rep. Paul); 149 CONG. REC. H7311 (daily ed. July 22, 2003);
147 CONG. REC. H4192 (daily ed. July 18, 2001). Second, the joint resolution
was a nonbinding "sense of Congress" statement that was never codified as part
of the CSA. See, e.g., Yang v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 183 F.3d 953, 958-59 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that the "sense of Congress" resolution did not amount to
positive, enforceable law). One senator noted: "While this is simply a sense of
the Senate to prohibit the use of Federal funds for medical use of marijuana, I
intend to work with my colleagues on legislation on this issue following the
budget resolution."
144 CONG. REc. S2814 (daily ed. March 31, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Smith). Yet no legislation amending the CSA to address
medical marijuana has passed since 1998. Unless Congress agreed to actually
amend the CSA, these "expressions of a subsequent Congress" generally are not
"particularly useful in ascertaining the intent of [the] earlier Congress" when it
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political that Congress has been unable to resolve it on the merits
alone.347 In response to congressional inaction, California and

enacted the CSA. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 211 n.23 (1983). Finally, the language of the joint
resolution simply urges that Congress is opposed to medical marijuana, but it
does not explicitly state that Congress intends to preempt state initiatives in
During the debates, some Congressmen likened the federal
this area.
government's regulation of medical marijuana to alcohol regulation during
Prohibition. 144 CONG. REC. H7724 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Paul). Others argued the resolution "is strictly here for political purposes, and
it should not be dignified with our votes because it deprives the States and the
people from making a decision in the local areas for their own determination."
Id. at H7722 (statement of Rep. Waxman). Still others characterized it as
"entirely consistent with Proposition 215 in California," arguing that the
resolution simply shows "Congress continues to support the existing Federal
legal process," and "a vote against this resolution, then, is to take the position
that Congress no longer supports the existing Federal legal process." Id. at
H7722 (statement of Rep. Cox) (emphasis added).
The resolution required reports to provide information so that Congress
can "get the FDA to focus as much as they are focused on tobacco on what
happens when we put marijuana in those cigarettes." Id. at H7723 (statement
of Rep. Cox). The Institute of Medicine study referenced above recognized both
the potential therapeutic value as well as the potential harmful effects of
smoked marijuana, and cautiously endorsed the medical use of marijuana,
concluding that "[sicientific data indicate the potential therapeutic value of
cannabinoid drugs, primarily THC, for pain relief, control of nausea and
vomiting, and appetite stimulation." INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note
343, at 44. In addition, the 2001 AMA report referenced above called for more
research. AMA REPORT, supra note 343.
Even if the joint resolution may be considered part of the extrinsic
information relevant for interpreting Congressional intent under the CSA, its
application does not mandate preemption of Proposition 215. Because it
appears that the purpose of the joint resolution was the same as that of the
original CSA-to address drug abuse and drug trafficking, along with the need
for more information about marijuana-a court could reconcile the joint
resolution as well as the CSA with Proposition 215 to allow individual use of
medicinal marijuana by a doctor's prescription.
347. The battle over medical marijuana has raged in Congress for more than
two decades. At least eight bills have been introduced in the house supporting
the end of prohibition of medical marijuana use. See, e.g., H.R. 2233, 108th
Cong. (2003); H.R. 1344, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R.
1782, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2618, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2232, 99th Cong.
(1985); H.R. 2282, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 4498, 97th Cong. (1981). Although
the earlier bills focused on amendment of the CSA to allow marijuana as
medication, more recent proposals have focused on recognition of state powers.
The two most recent bills were titled "States' Rights to Medical Marijuana."
H.R. 2233; H.R. 1344. Further, in the last two budget cycles, members of
Congress have introduced and debated amendments to the federal budget bill to
prohibit any funds for the Department of Justice from being "used to prevent
the States . . .from implementing State laws authorizing the use of medical
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Arizona voters took the issue into their own hands and passed the
nation's first ballot initiative laws addressing medical marijuana:
California's Proposition 215, also known as the California
Compassionate Use Act of 1996, 8 and Arizona's Proposition 200 .
Other states soon -followed suit. In November of 1998, three more
states passed medical marijuana initiatives: Oregon,
Alaska, 5 '
and Washington.35 2 Maine voters passed a medical marijuana

marijuana in those States." 147 CONG. REC. H4190 (daily ed. July 18, 2001);
see also 149 CONG. REC. H7311 (daily ed. July 22, 2003). Although House Bill
2233 had twenty-five sponsors in 2003, none of the measures in support of
medical marijuana have garnered majority support to date.
348. Cal. Proposition 215 (1996) (codified as The California Compassionate
Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2000)). For the full
text of Proposition 215, see supra note 24.
349. Proposition 200, codified as Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and
Control Act of 1996, ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3412.01 (2004). See National
Families in Action, A Guide to Drug-Related State Ballot Initiatives, Arizona
Proposition
200
(Summary),
at http://www.nationalfamilies.org/guide/
arizona200.html (last updated Apr. 23, 2002). Proposition 200 was an extensive
effort to mandate drug treatment and education programs over imprisonment.
This initiative allowed doctors to prescribe all Schedule I illicit drugs, including
marijuana, as medicine.
350. Measure 67, codified as Oregon Medical Marijuana Act, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 475.300-.346 (2003). Fifty-five percent of Oregon registered voters approved
Measure 67, which removed state-level criminal penalties on the use,
possession, and cultivation of marijuana by patients who possess a signed
recommendation from their physician stating that marijuana "may mitigate"
their symptoms. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.309 (2003). The full text of the Oregon
Medical Marijuana Rules is available at http://www.dhs.state.or.us/
publichealth/mmloarrev.cfm. See also Press Release, Oregon Department of
Human Services, Nation's First Medical Marijuana Registry "Working as
Intended" (Oct. 19, 2000), available at www.dhs.state.or.us/publichealth/
archive/2000/1019hclcmm.cfm.
351. Ballot Measure 8, codified as Medical Uses of Marijuana for Persons
Suffering from Debilitating Medical Conditions Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010.37.070 (Michie 2003). The measure passed 58% to 42%. The Alaska legislature
then passed Senate Bill 94, which required all patients seeking legal protection
under the act to enroll in the state patient registry and possess a valid
identification card. The Department of Health and Social Services then issued
approximately two hundred cards in the year after the initiative's approval.
Patients who failed to enrolled in the registry could no longer argue the
"affirmative defense of medical necessity" if arrested on marijuana charges. See
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), Active
State Medical Marijuana Programs (Alaska), at http://www.norml.org/
index.cfm?GroupID=3391 (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
352. Initiative Measure No. 692, codified as Medical Use of Marijuana Act,
WASH. REV. CODE Ch. 69.51A (2004). Fifty-nine percent of Washington voters
approved Measure 692, which excused qualified patients with terminal illnesses
from conviction of state crimes for the possession or use of marijuana.
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measure in 1999, 3"3 and in 2000, Colorado354 and Nevada joined the
ranks of states with medical marijuana initiatives. 356 Four years
35'

355

Furthermore, persons who act as primary caregivers to such patients shall also
not be found guilty of a crime under state law for assisting with the medical use
of marijuana.

See WASHINGTON CITIZENS FOR MEDICAL RIGHTS, A GUIDE FOR

PATIENTS AND PHYSICIANS (June 1, 1999), available at http://www.eventure.coml
i692/Pages/brochure.html.
353. Question 2, codified as Maine Medical Marijuana Act of 1998, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. Tit. 15, § 5821-A (West 2004). The initiative authorized possession
and use of marijuana for specific medical conditions when a doctor advises
patients that they might benefit from the drug. See Maine Becomes Eighth
State to Affirm Medical Marijuana in the Ballot Box, Nov. 2, 1999, at
http://www.marijuana.org/MaineReport.htm; see also An Act to Permit the
Medical Use of Marijuana, 1999 Maine Medical Marijuana Initiative, available
at http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills- 119th/billtextsfLD210901-1.asp
(last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
354. Amendment 20, codified as Medical Use of Marijuana for Persons
Suffering from Debilitating Medical Conditions, CoLo CONST. art. XVIII § 14.
Under this Amendment, people with certain medical conditions can, with a note
from their doctor, legally possess small amounts of marijuana. National
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), Medical Marijuana
Initiatives Pass in Colorado and Nevada; Californians Pass Initiative to Keep
Non-Violent Drug Offenders Out of Jail (Nov.
9,
2000),
at
http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group-ID=4227.
355. Ballot Question 9, codified as NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453A.010-.810 (2003).
Sixty-five percent of Nevada voters approved Question 9, which amends the
Nevada Constitution to recognize the medical use of marijuana. NEV. CONST.
art. IV, § 38. See Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), Active
State
Medical
Marijuana
Programs
(Nevada),
at
http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group-ID=3391 (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
The legislature approved regulations implementing the measure on June 4,
2001.
However, Republican Governor Kenny Guinn refused to fund the
program in his $3.8 billion budget for fiscal years 2001-2003, claiming the state
could not afford the program's estimated $30,000 administration costs. See
News Release, Libertarian Party of Nevada, Effort to Fund Nevada Medical
Marijuana Program (Sept. 2, 2001), available at www.lpnevada.org/
newsreleases/NR010902.htm.
356. Federal administrative officials have refused to recognize these state
initiatives, however. In February of 2002, federal marshals swarmed the
HARM cannabis cooperative in downtown San Francisco and seized a truckload
of materials the group made available to patients as authorized by Proposition
215. In the early hours of dawn on the same day, federal agents arrested Ed
Rosenthal, a fifty-eight-year-old marijuana activist and writer, for cultivating
marijuana plants in violation of the CSA. Jurors who later convicted Rosenthal
on federal charges said they would have acquitted him if the judge had allowed
them to hear Rosenthal's defense that he cultivated the plants for the City of
Oakland's medical marijuana program. Jeff Chorney & Josh Richman,
Protesters Put Heat on DEA Chief, Hundreds Boo Visiting Official After Bay
Area MarijuanaRaids, TRI-VALLEY HERALD (Pleasanton, Cal.), Feb. 13, 2002 at
1. Although the prosecutor asked for a six-and-a-half-year prison term, the
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later, the trend continued when Montana passed a medical
marijuana initiative in the November 2004 elections.357
B. JudicialReaction: United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Cultivators Club
California's Proposition 21535" provides an ideal context for
examining the impact of applying the more rigorous presumption
against preemption standard to ballot initiative preemption cases.
Soon after Proposition 215 passed, nonprofit cannabis clubs formed
throughout California to dispense marijuana to patients who had
received a doctor's recommendation.
The U.S. Government challenged the validity of Proposition 215
in United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club.35 9 The federal
government sought an injunction against some of the clubs
distributing medical marijuana, arguing that even though their
activities might be legal under the ballot initiative, they violated
provisions of the CSA. In 1998, the district court granted the United
States' motion for a preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the motion and remanded with directions for the
district court to consider the medical needs of the users.361 On
federal judge only sentenced Rosenthal to one day in prison. Eric Bailey &
Marcelo Rodriguez, The 'Guru of Ganja' Gets a Day in Jail, L.A. TIMEs, June 5,
2003, at 2.
Federal agents also rushed into the home of forty-two-year-old Suzanne
Pfeil who suffers from post-polio syndrome. Pfeil is paralyzed from the waist
down, but the agents pointed rifles at her and handcuffed her hands behind her
back during the raid. 149 CONG. REC. S10846 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Durbin).
357. 2004 Mont. Laws. Init. Measure 148. For more information about state
laws legalizing medical marijuana, see generally Andrew J. Boyd, Medical
Marijuana and Personal Autonomy, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1253 (2004). For
more information about Montana specifically, see http://www.MontanaCares
.org.
358. The critical language of Proposition 215 for purposes of this analysis is
in section 1(b)(1)(A):
To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to
obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that
medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended
by a physician who has determined that the person's health
would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of
... illness[es] for which marijuana provides relief.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (Deering 2000). For the full text
of Proposition 215, see supra note 24.
359. 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd sub nom. United States
v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer's Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
360. Id. at 1105.
361. Id. at 1109.
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remand, the district court modified the injunction to permit patients
to claim a medical necessity defense. 2 The government appealed,
and the Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, ignored the fact that
Proposition 215 was a ballot initiative that addressed health and
safety, issues of a local nature, and did not apply any presumption
against preemption. The Court focused solely on the text of the
CSA. The CSA makes it unlawful to "manufacture, distribute, or
dispense" marijuana.3 63 Justice Thomas stated that the words were
Although the Act contained some
"apparently absolute."3 '
exceptions, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to
allow an3 "additional,
implied exception[]" of common law medical
65
necessity.

If the Court had applied a presumption against preemption, it
could have considered other methods that might have permitted a
reconciliation of the CSA and Proposition 215. The CSA contains an
explicit exception for marijuana used in government-approved
research projects.366 Silence with respect to other exceptions (such
as valid medical use) does not perforce preclude the finding of these
exceptions. In other cases, the Court has interpreted congressional
silence on a matter in favor of avoiding conflict. 7 Thus, express
preemption arguably did not apply because Congress never
explicitly preempted the medical necessity defense in the CSA,368
and therefore, the defense should have survived.
Indeed, three justices concurring in Oakland Cannabis
employed some of the presumption against preemption techniques
and left open the possibility that portions of Proposition 215 could
survive preemption by the CSA. They noted that their holding was
limited only to the issue of medical necessity as "a defense to
manufacturing and distributingmarijuana."36 9 These were the only

362. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer's Coop., No. 98-0088, 2000
WL 1517166, at *1 (N.D. Cal., July 17, 2000).
363. Specifically, § 841(a) of the CSA makes it unlawful for any person to
"manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000).
364. Oakland Cannabis,532 U.S. at 490.
365. Id. at 490.
366. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 829, cited by the
concurring opinion in Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 500 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
367. E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
368. Justice Thomas rejected the cooperative's argument that the CSA
required an "explicit" statement to abrogate the medical necessity exception.
Oakland Cannabis,532 U.S. at 491 n.4.
369. Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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issues raised in the context of the cooperatives' sale of marijuana in
their clubs, and these justices agreed that the CSA "cannot bear a
medical necessity defense to distributions of marijuana." 30 The
concurring justices based their conclusion on two things. First, they
considered the structure of the statute, noting that the CSA
37
prohibited distribution outside of approved research projects. 1
Second, the concurring justices noted that because the defendants
"elect[ed] to become distributors," they did "not fit the paradigm of a
defendant who may assert necessity."3 72 Thus, the concurring
justices specifically reserved judgment on whether the defense
might still be available to individuals.
C. Using a Heightened Presumption When Applying Proposition
215 to Individual Use
Application of a rigorous presumption against preemption may
allow provisions of Proposition 215 to survive federal preemption,
particularly those provisions applicable to individual possession and
use of medical marijuana. Under this more rigorous presumption, a
court must adopt any sensible interpretation of Proposition 215 and
the CSA to avoid a preemptive conflict.
Proposition 215 when applied to the individual possession and
use of medical marijuana represents the type of ballot initiative
situation that warrants application of a heightened presumption.
Proposition 215 involves social experimentation in the traditional
state topic area of health and safety. Individual use of medical
marijuana expands the right of the user and does not infringe on the
rights of others. Furthermore, individual use of medical marijuana
under Proposition 215 arguably does not trigger concerns about
widespread drug trafficking in a way that manufacture and
distribution of the drug might have. Furthermore, to the extent a
court permits the CSA to preempt all possibility of marijuana use
under Proposition 215, it has curtailed this valuable medical
experiment at the state level.
A heightened presumption would allow a court to reconcile
Proposition 215 with the CSA by applying a broad interpretation of
the words of the federal act. Although possession of marijuana
"with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense" is a felony
under the CSA,373 possession of "a personal use amount" is subject
370. Id. at 500 (Stevens, J., concurring).
371. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
372. Id. at 500 n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that defendants "cannot
claim necessity based upon the choice of evils facing seriously ill patients, as
that is not the same choice [defendants] face").
373. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). The statute outlines specific sentences for
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only to a civil penalty under a more recently added section of the
Act. 374 Furthermore, section 844(a), the original CSA section
addressing "simple possession," contains an explicit exception for
possession "pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a
practitioner."375
Although the CSA does not define "prescription," a federal
district court wrestled with the meaning of the term in a different
context in United States v. Nazir.37 6 Nazir involved charges against
a physician for writing phony prescriptions, a crime under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 7 Because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act does not contain a definition for "prescription," the Nazir court
turned to a dictionary and concluded that the word means "a bona
fide order-i.e., directions for the preparation and administration of
a medicine, remedy, or drug for a real patient who actually needs it
after some sort of examination or consultation by a licensed
doctor."3 7

If this broad definition of "prescription" is applied, then

individual possession of marijuana pursuant to the provisions of
Proposition 215 fits within the exceptions allowed by section
844(a).379
Specifically, Proposition 215 provides immunity from criminal
drug charges only to a patient or to a patient's primary caregiver
"who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical
purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or
approval of a physician."38 0 The plain meaning of the Proposition
215 language seems to correspond neatly with the Nazir definition
of "prescription" and the common meaning of the "prescription"
language in the § 844(a) exception.
Furthermore, the structure of Proposition 215 illustrates that
its purpose is consistent with the objectives of the CSA. The ballot
initiative specifically disclaims any intent to "supersede legislation

1,000 kilograms or more of a mixture containing marijuana or 1,000 or more
marijuana plants. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii).
374. Id. § 844a(a).
375. Id. § 844(a).
376. 211 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
377. The charge addressing the word "prescription" was under 21 U.S.C.
§ 353(b)(1). Nazir, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1374.
378. Id. at 1375.
379. Because marijuana is listed under Schedule I of the CSA, one might
argue that there could be no "valid" prescription for it because Schedule I
substances are not allowed to be prescribed for any use. However, the
heightened presumption would allow a court to presume that the word "valid"
in the phrase "valid prescription" under § 844(a) means valid under state law,
that is, valid under Proposition 215.
380. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2000).
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prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that endangers others,
nor to condone the diversion of marijuana for nonmedicinal
purposes."3 8' Proposition 215 lists three goals distinct from those of
the CSA:
(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to
obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes... [when]
recommended by a physician....
(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers ...
are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction [for using
marijuana medically, and]
(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to
implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable
distribution382of marijuana to all patients in medical need of
marijuana.

In contrast to Proposition 215's objectives, the structure and
extrinsic information about the CSA support two objectives for the
CSA that need not conflict with the personal medical use of
marijuana under Proposition 215: the prevention of drug abuse and
drug trafficking. Section 801 further specifies that the CSA was
intended to focus on (1) the "substantial and detrimental effect on
the health and general welfare of the American people" from
"improper use" 383 and (2) the interstate and international trafficking
of illegal drugs4

The legislative history of the CSA also supports the conclusion
that it was enacted to address the first objective, drug abuse.
Initially the Act was titled the "Comprehensive Drug Abuse
According to the House
Prevention and Control Act of 1970.",3
to
deal
in a comprehensive
Report: "This legislation is designed
fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United
386 In addition, the Report emphasized that the objective was
States."
not to penalize individual abusers, but instead to rehabilitate

381. Id. § 11362.5(b)(2).
382. Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A)-(C).
383. 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2000).
384. Id. § 801(4)-(7) (listing problems with drug trafficking in four of the
seven opening declarations of the CSA).
385. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904
(2001)) (emphasis added).
386. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4566, 4567.
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Furthermore, regulation by a doctor's
individual abusers.387
prescription was part of the solution for preventing drug abuse.
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the CSA's objective of
preventing drug abuse in Oregon v. Ashcroft, a case rejecting the
federal government's efforts to criminalize physician-assisted
suicide permitted under Oregon's Death With Dignity Act.389 In
considering the express purpose of the CSA, the Oregon v. Ashcroft
court noted that "[tihe stated purpose of the CSA is 'to provide
increased research into, and prevention of, drug abuse and drug
dependence . . . and to strengthen existing law enforcement
authority in the field of drug abuse.' 39 0 The court went on to state

that "physician assisted suicide is not a form of drug 'abuse' that
Congress intended the CSA to cover"; instead, it is "an unrelated,
general medical practice to be regulated by state lawmakers. ' 39'
Furthermore, the Oregon v. Ashcroft court quoted a letter written by
Attorney General Janet Reno stating that the CSA was not
"intended to displace the states as the primary regulators of the
medical profession, or to override a state's determination as to what
constitutes legitimate medical practice."392
Similarly, marijuana used pursuant to a doctor's approval does
not seem to fall within the meaning of "detrimental effect" on health
or "improper use," which were the ills addressed by the CSA. Under
a heightened presumption against preemption, the use of medical
marijuana according to a doctor's recommendation under
Proposition 215 could be interpreted as an unrelated, general
medical practice falling within the explicit exception for drug use

387. Id. at 9, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4575.
388. 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 2005 WL 405754 (No. 04623) (Feb. 22, 2005).
389. OR. REV. STAT. §127.800-.97 (2003). On November 4, 1997, Oregon
voters reaffirmed their support for the act (which originally passed in 1994 by a
ballot initiative) by defeating a ballot measure that sought to repeal it. See
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1122.
390. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1121 (quoting The Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (preamble) (also citing United States
v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 141 (1975)), cert. granted, 2005 WL 405754 (No. 04-623)
(Feb. 22, 2005); Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 194
(9th Cir. 1975) ("[Nloting that the purpose of the CSA is to 'counter drug
abuse'"); see also H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,
4567 ("This legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the
growing menace of drug abuse in the United States .. ").
391. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1125-26 (citations omitted).
392. Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General (Jan. 5, 1998) (quoted in
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1123).
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pursuant to a prescription permitted by section 844(a).393
The legislative history also supports the second purpose of the
CSA: the prevention of drug trafficking. Again, the House Report
issued at the time the legislation was enacted noted that "[tlhe
illegal traffic in drugs should be attacked with the full power of the
Federal Government."394
The Ninth Circuit also addressed this drug trafficking objective
of the CSA in Raich v. Ashcroft, the medical marijuana case argued
before the U.S. Supreme Court on November 29, 2004. 395 The Raich
appellants contended their personal use of medical marijuana under
Proposition 215 was not equivalent to "drug trafficking" as
prohibited by the CSA.396
The court agreed, stating that "the
intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of
marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of 39a7
physician . .. is, in fact, different in kind from drug trafficking."
Based on Commerce Clause grounds, the Raich court concluded that
when there is no purchase or sale, the limited personal use of
marijuana as allowed by Proposition 215 can "not
[be] properly
398
characterized as commercial or economic activity."

393. Even if the Supreme Court upholds Proposition 215 and prescribing
medical marijuana becomes legal, economic factors may deter doctors from
doing so. An increasing number of medical malpractice insurers are denying
coverage to physicians who recommend marijuana to patients. See Medical
Marijuana and Malpractice, American Political Network, American Health
Line, vol. 10, No. 9 (July 25, 2003).
394. H.R. No. 91-1444, at 9 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,
4575
395. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1222; see also County of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 314
F. Supp. 2d 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
396. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 1229. In Raich, the Ninth Circuit granted a preliminary
injunction, concluding that the Commerce Clause did not support imposition of
the CSA to regulate the "intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession, and
use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician" as
allowed by Proposition 215. Id. at 1228. In finding that the marijuana users
made a strong showing on the likelihood of success on the merits, the court
applied the four-factor test from United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
The court concluded that CSA could not apply to the individual use of
marijuana under Proposition 215 because: (1) the activity it sought to regulate
was not commerce or any sort of economic enterprise; (2) the CSA did not
contain an express jurisdictional element that would limit the reach of the
statute to a discrete set of cases that substantially affects interstate commerce;
(3) the legislative history contained express congressional findings on the effects
of intrastate drug activity on interstate commerce, but these findings were not
specific to medical marijuana and "are primarily concerned with the trafficking
or distribution of controlled substances" manufactured and distributed
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If the Supreme Court affirms Raich, there would be no need to
apply a heightened presumption against preemption in the context
of Proposition 215. If regulation of the personal use of medical
marijuana falls outside the reach of the federal government's
Commerce Clause authority, there is no basis for the federal
government to urge that the CSA should preempt California's state
ballot initiative. However, such a holding would mark a significant
retreat from the Court's current position on the scope of federal
authority under the Commerce Clause. 99 Furthermore, it might
potentially have far reaching impacts such as prohibiting federal
regulation of any marijuana use, regardless of whether the use was
there was any state statute or ballot
medicinal or not or whether
40 0
initiative regulating it.

In contrast, the heightened presumption against preemption
standard strikes a balance between recognizing the authority of the
people to speak on their own behalf about such issues through ballot
initiatives and allowing federal regulation in matters such as drug
abuse and drug trafficking that may have serious nationwide
impacts. Furthermore, preemption decisions are determined by the
judicial branch. Consequently, the courts may serve as the arbiters
not only of federal and state powers, but also of the direct power of
the people.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Ballot initiatives play a unique role in the American system of
government. While they have their critics, they are the only
substantial method of direct democracy allowed under this country's
system of government. The ballot initiative process has a number of
advantages, perhaps most importantly its ability to bypass

intrastate; and (4) the link between the regulation of medical marijuana and a
substantial effect on interstate commerce is too "attenuated" to support federal
efforts to regulate it. Id. at 1229-34. The court concluded that previous
decisions upholding the CSA on Commerce Clause grounds were based on "the
commercial nature of drug trafficking." Id. at 1230. In contrast, the court
concluded here that the marijuana was not sold, nor did the "aggregation
principle" of Wickard v.Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), apply because "the
regulated activity in this case is not commercial." Id. at 1230.
399. For more discussion of the Commerce Clause issues, see supra note 23
and accompanying text.
400. In concluding that the "aggregation principle" from Wickard v. Filburn
did not apply, the Raich court concluded that "the marijuana at issue in this
case is similarly non-fungible, as its use is personal and the appellants do not
seek to exchange it or to acquire marijuana from others in a market." Raich,
352 F.3d at 1231. It seems that similar reasoning could be applied in
arguments for the personal use of marijuana for any reason.

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

legislatures. Moreover, the need to do so is probably greatest in
connection with social issues involving matters of traditional local
concern, such as health and safety, where no clear consensus has
emerged. 40 '
Ballot initiatives have involved such legislatively
difficult topics as assisted suicide, legalization of medical marijuana,
animal rights and, most recently, stem cell research. In these
circumstances, political expediency will often favor inaction.
This process of social experimentation, however, threatens to be
hindered by the application of the preemption doctrine. In a number
of these areas, preexisting federal laws, laws often adopted long
before consideration of the emerging issues addressed by the ballot
initiatives, may preempt state ballot initiatives. The effect is to
shift the matter to the federal level. Change at the federal level is
likely only when a national consensus on the difficult social issues
has been reached.4 °2 Yet by invalidating these measures and taking
them away from the states, the preemption doctrine has in fact
curtailed the process of consensus formation.
The process of social experimentation needs to continue, and it
needs to continue at the state level. For this to occur, courts need to
accept a more narrow reading of the preemption clause. Courts
would still be required to determine whether the state and federal
laws conflict. In the case of ballot initiatives involving personal
issues of health and safety, however, the courts would be required to
adopt any "sensible" interpretation that would reconcile the two
frameworks. In particular, this would require the courts to consider
Such a
extrinsic information beyond the text of a statute.
heightened deference would still allow Congress to preempt but
would otherwise prevent laws adopted in other eras and other times
from ending modern social experiments.

401. Again, note that this Article does not argue for greater deference to all
ballot initiatives, but is limited to social issues involving traditionally local
matters of health and safety. For a discussion of the reasons why this is a valid
limitation, see supra notes 151-77 and accompanying text.

402. Even after a consensus has been reached, a vociferous minority may
still succeed in preventing legislative reform. Polls suggest that a national
consensus exists in favor of gun control, yet laws implementing the consensus
are notoriously hard to get through Congress.

